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The title has been suggested by an article of two knowledgeable
spokesmen of the American Bar Association, Timothy K. McPike and Mark I.
Harrison,' who responded to the question of whether the profession is lax in
dealing with incompetent and dishonest lawyers in the United States. The
point of departure of that and like articles is the Clark Committee Report2 that
not only disclosed widespread tolerance by lawyers of professional misconduct
but recommended a thirty-six point program for combating the malaise. These
recommendations in turn precipitated the American Bar Association Stan-
dards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings (hereinafter "ABA
Standards"). McPike and Harrison concluded that a perception of professional
laxity in dealing with the incompetent and dishonest is unfair, detail the many
accomplishments since the Clark expose, and acknowledge that work remains
to be done to complete the Clark reforms.
Ohio is pointed out as among a small minority of states (three) that "still
uses procedures identified in the Clark Report . . . as fostering abuse."3
Although overdrawn, their criticism is not unfair, if the Clark Report's recom-
mendations and the ABA Standards are accepted as norms. For, the in-
vestigative and prosecutorial ("relatorship") functions are highly decentralized
in Ohio. Moreover, Ohio differs markedly from the ABA Standards with
regard to several fundamental conceptions of sanctions, namely in Ohio's "per-
manent disbarment," irrevocable voluntary resignation, and "indefinite
suspension." Further, Ohio has failed to avail itself of several other useful
sanctions that help "fine tune" the disciplinary machinery.4
Ohio's disciplinary machinery, seemingly controversial from the perspec-
*A.B., JD., LL.M., J.S.D., Professor of Law and former Dean, The University of Akron School of Law. The
author has served on the Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct, the Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion, and the Inquiry and Grievance Committees of the Akron Bar Association. The views are those of the
author.
The author expreses gratitude to two law students, who assisted in research on the matter of
reinstatements, Messrs. Bobby Murphy and Robert Tucker, and who are now members of the Ohio Bar.
'T. McPike & M. Harrison, The True Story of Lawyer Discipline. 70 A.B.A.J., Sept. 1984, at 92.
'Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement. Tom C. Clark, Chairman, 95
Rep. A.B.A. 783 (1970), (hereinafter "Clark Report").
'The True Story of Lawyer Discipline, supra note I, at 94.
4Suspension for a fixed term not to exceed three years, probation not to exceed two years, and court-ordered
restitution are among sanctions not authorized by court rule in Ohio.
1
Samad: Lawyer Discipline in Ohio
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1985
AKRON LAW REVIEW
tive of the ABA, is a paradox resulting from an accident of recent history. In
1952, the ABA created a Special Committee to formulate model grievance and
disciplinary procedures "for uniform and effective enforcement of the stan-
dards of conduct prescribed by the Canons of Professional and Judicial
Ethics," which subsequently issued the ABA Report of the Special Committee
on Disciplinary Procedures' (the "Phillips Report" after its Chairman, Chief
Judge Orie L. Phillips), a precursor of the Clark Report. Serving on the Com-
mittee was Benjamin C. Boer of Cleveland, Ohio, Ohio State Bar President in
1952, who filed a minority report.'
President Boer, through the Ohio State Bar Association,' on the one hand
precipitated reform in Ohio well antedating that stimulated by the Clark
Report, but Boer's philosophy of disciplinary proceeding on the other created
in Ohio a disciplinary hybrid - a hybrid at least from the perspective of the
ABA Standards. In advocating a decentralized system with the Ohio State Bar
Association and local bar associations as relators, Boer was protecting the turf
of the state as well as powerful local bar associations in Akron, Cincinnati,
Cleveland, Columbus, Toledo and Youngstown, Ohio.
Boer favored a larger role of the bar association than that assigned by the
Phillips majority, a concept of permanent disbarment without the prospect of
reinstatement, that suspension should be for an indefinite and not for a fixed
period, and that a lawyer who voluntarily resigned from the bar should never
be reinstated. Ohio's reformatory rule change of 1956 (Rule XXVII, effective
in 1957)1 incorporated Boer's thinking, except for irrevocable resignation that
did not become effective until 1972. 9
That Ohio's hybrid system "worked" was demonstrated by Professor
Schroeder's ten year study of 115 cases0 that were tried under reformatory
Rule XXVII: "Discipline was simple and most effective; reinstatement was
most demanding, not automatic."" The reason the reformed procedure looked
good was that Schroeder was comparing the post-1956 results with what had
gone on before. 2 The "before" picture in Ohio was in microcosm that which
'Report of Special Committee on Disciplinary Procedure, Orie L. Phillips, Chairman, 81 Rep. A.B.A. 475
(1956).
1Id. at 477.
'See Presidents Address, 25 Ohio St. B.A. Rep. 357 (May, 1952), an address delivered by President Benjamin
C. Boer during the Annual Meeting of the Ohio State Bar Association, May 1952.
1167 Ohio St. liii, at lxxvi (1958).
'29 Ohio St. 2d xxix, at xxxiii (1972).
'40. Schroeder, Jr., Lawyer Discipline: The Ohio Story (1967), hereinafter "Schroeder."
"Id. at 23.
"See, e.g., In re King, 54 Ohio St. 415, 43 N.E. 680 (1896), Disbarment by common pleas court, and
reinstatement by court pursuant to a statute (R.S. Sec. 563), authorizing the supreme court, court of appeals,
or court of common pleas to suspend or remove an attorney-at-law for misconduct, and by implication the
disbarring or suspending court could reinstate; In re Disbarment of Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. 35, 125 N.E. 2d
328 (1955), Disbarred in June 1937, amended to two year suspension in October, 1937, reinstated in 1945,
guilty of unprofessional conduct resulting in common pleas court disbarment in 1953, reversed by the court
[Vol. 18:3
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LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN OHIO
Clark disclosed in his report as generally prevailing in the United States - a
system that was apathetic, antiquated, decentralized and deficient.
Notwithstanding the overall favorable grade on Ohio's performance given
by Professor Schroeder, his study suggested several problems. Given a struc-
ture of discipline based on permanent disbarment (contrary to the ABA con-
ception) 3, indefinite suspension (also contrary to the ABA definition)', public
reprimand and private reprimand, a wide gap existed between indefinite
suspension and public reprimand. Given a partner who filed a federal partner-
ship income tax return (informational) but who failed to follow up with an in-
dividual federal tax return on one occasion, and who was therefore guilty of a
federal misdemeanor, should the sanction be public reprimand or indefinite
suspension? 5 Or, what of an attorney who effected a loan from his client to a
third party borrower, and along with two others split a finder's fee paid by the
borrower, without the knowledge of the client, and where payments under the
loan were not forthcoming? 6 To this and other misconduct that did not in-
volve egregious or repeated misconduct the simple answer was a fixed period
suspension. Such sanction was not authorized in Ohio until 1981 and it was
fixed as one year. 7
Secondly, the number of abortive attempts at discipline revealed in the
Schroeder study was disturbing. About one case in seven, or fourteen percent
of the cases, were dismissed by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline or by the court either on a procedural point (one case) or insufficient
evidence of a substantial violation of the rules (thirteen cases). These data sug-
gested the factor of inexperience of the voluntary agents of the many relators
in Ohio who operated with voluntary personnel.
Thirdly, Table J in the Schroeder report indicated the expiration of an
average of 422 days and a median of 382 days between date of complaint and
of appeals who in turn was reversed by supreme court and case remanded; Lake County Bar Association v.
Cooperman, 173 Ohio St. 330, 181 N.E. 2d 903 (1962), Admitted to the bar in 1928, disbarred in 1939,
modified to indefinite suspension in 1945, and reinstated; moved from Cuyahoga County to Lake County,
suspended for three months by Lake County Court of Common Pleas in 1949, and permanently disbarred in
this action for endorsing and negotiating checks payable to a client without authorization, charging ex-
cessive fees, solicitation, etc.
See also President's Address, supra note 7, at 359-60.
"American Bar Association Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disability Proceedings, Adopted Feb.,
1979 (hereinafter "ABA Standards"), 6.2: "The lawyer should not be able to apply for readmission until at
least five years after the effective date of his disbarment .. "
'ABA Standard 6.3: "Suspension should be imposed for a specified period not in excess of three years."
"The response was indefinite suspension in Cincinnati Bar Association v. Beall, 54 Ohio St. 2d 168, 375
N.E. 2d 423 (1978). (Beall has been reinstated.)
"A one year suspension was ordered; Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Nesbitt, 69 Ohio St. 2d 108,
431 N.E. 2d 323 (1982).
"Amendment to THE SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAR OF
OHIO, Rule V, Sec. 6, 63 Ohio St. 2d xxvii, at xxix (1980), effective Jan. I, 1981 (hereinafter "Gov. R. V").
"sSupra note 10, at 124.
Winter, 19851
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date of the court decision, and an average number of days of 1053 and a me-
dian number of days of 791 between the date of the incident and the filing of
the complaint, or an average of 1532 days and a median of 1415 days between
the date of the incident and the court decision date. Surely, a delay factor of
more than four years during which the offender continues to practice unless
convicted of a crime or found to be mentally ill is too long and suggests the
need for further reform.
What the Schroeder report does not reveal is whether like offenses are
treated alike by Ohio's then ninety-five potential relators. 19 Is an attorney,
whose negligence results in the running of the statute of limitations against his
client's cause, subject to discipline, or does discipline result only if there are ag-
gravating factors (e.g., lying to the client about the matter)? Is the guileless but
mistaken young attorney who fails to establish a client's fund (trust) account
and who borrows from settlement of claims to provide short term financing
from his law practice and who thus delays the client's receipt of money subject-
ed to discipline, or merely admonishment by a local grievance committee?
Does it matter in either instance whether the attorney is well liked and well re-
ceived by the established bar, or whether his life style, professional or other-
wise, is frowned upon by the establishment? In a small county with few practi-
tioners and close personal and professional contacts, are one's friends and asso-
ciates willing to do "the noisesome work" of investigation and prosecution?
One cannot tell from the cases filed what cases should have been filed, or
whether like offenses are treated uniformly among the many relators. One can
only conclude along with Clark that, "A decentralized structure, utilizing a
multiplicity of disciplinary agencies and courts, also produces a substantial
lack of uniformity in discipline imposed, which is aggravated by an absence of
intrastate coordination."2 Ohio has centralized the rule making and ad-
judicatory power in the state's supreme court. For the most part,2 however, in-
vestigation and prosecution continued in the hands of county bar associations
with little intrastate coordination, during the period of this study.
The aim of this study is to describe discipline in Ohio for the seventeen
year period following the Schroeder study, to evaluate its effectiveness, and to
suggest reforms intended to make the system fairer and more effective.
"Ohio has eighty-eight counties, each of which has at least one bar association. Larger counties (e.g.,
Cuyahoga) have two. Until recently, the Ohio State Bar Association was a relator. The Disciplinary Counsel
of the Supreme Court is a relator. Most local bar associations do not have a disciplinary counsel or an in-
vestigator, but operate with volunteers.
'"Clark Report, supra note 2, at 821.
"Disciplinary Counsel has exclusive jurisdiction to act as relator in complaints alleging violation of DR
2-101 and DR 2-102(A) and (B) that deal with advertising and professional notices, letterhead, office signs
and law lists, with regard to which uniformity is necessary: and under Supreme Court Rules for the Govern-
ment of the Judiciary. Rule i, Sec. 3, dealing with Disciplinary Procedures for the judiciary. See Samad,
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A summary of disciplinary actions in Ohio during this period appears as
Table 1, based on cases reported in the official Ohio State Reports and on the
disciplinary docket of the supreme court as it appears from time to time in the
Ohio State Bar Association Journal (OBAR).
DISBARMENT IN OHIO
Prior to the amendments to the disciplinary rule of 1957, two decisions,
among others, provide insight into the meaning of disbarment in Ohio, In re
King22 and In re Disbarment of Lieberman.23 In 1882, King was disbarred by
the Common Pleas Court of Henry County for conviction of an offense in-
volving moral turpitude. Upon a reversal of his conviction, he applied for ad-
mission to the bar as if an initial admittee, to a second common pleas court,
and was admitted. He failed to inform the second court of his prior disbarment.
The current action was begun in Henry County to revoke the second cer-
tificate. The lower court revoked the certificate on the grounds of fraud in its
procurement, and failing to follow the proper procedure for reinstatement. The
proper procedure was to apply to the court which disbarred him for reinstate-
ment, in a proper showing of reformation "or other satisfactory reason." This
early decision indicates that disbarment was not permanent but revocable, that
reinstatement was possible, and that trial courts of general jurisdiction exer-
cised jurisdiction to disbar under applicable statute.
In Lieberman, decided fifty-nine years later, the respondent was disbarred
for solicitation and for mishandling clients' funds, in June, 1937. In October of
that year, the sanction was amended to two year probation, provided he make
restitution. In 1945, he was reinstated. In 1953, he was again charged in the
common pleas court of unprofessional conduct and the finding was against
him. On appeal, the finding was reversed by the court of appeals and the
charges dismissed. The issue of the case concerned questions of evidence. The
point for this discussion is that disbarment in Ohio was but a form of indefinite
suspension, with no minimum period for cessation of practice, and that courts
other than the supreme court continued to exercise the power to disbar.24
All this was changed by Rule XXVII, effective January 1, 1957. "Miscon-
duct" under the statute (Ohio Rev. Code § 4705.02, Gen. Code § 1707, and its
I2Supra note 12.
231d.
'By amendment to Rule XXVII, effective Jan. I, 1946, the supreme court began to exercise control over
reinstatements 147 Ohio St. lxxvii. Section 2 of Rule XXVII read:
When, after due notice and hearing, a disbarred or indefinitely suspended attorney at law has been
ordered reinstated by a court of this state other than the Supreme Court, the court ordering the
reinstatement shall set forth in its journal entry its finding of facts and conclusions of law upon which
its order is based. The Clerk of that court shall certify forthwith to the Clerk of the Supreme Court a
copy of such journal entry; and if so ordered by the Supreme Court, the clerk thereof shall note on the
Journal and on the Roll of Attorneys that the privilege of engaging in the practice of law in this state
has been restored to such disbarred or indefinitely suspended attorney.
Winter, 19851
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precursor Rev. Stat. §563) was "misconduct in office, conviction of a crime in-
volving moral turpitude, or professional conduct involving moral turpitude."
Court Rule XXVII(5) (a) expanded the definition of the term "misconduct" to
include
any violation of any provision of the oath of office taken upon admission
to practice of law in this State, or any violation of the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics or the Canons of Judicial Ethics as adopted by the Court
from time to time, or the commission or conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
The Rule then set forth four levels of sanctions including "permanent disbar-
ment from the practice of law." The Rule did not then, nor does its current
counterpart (Government Rule V(5)), define those specific offenses that result
in disbarment, suspension or censure. This position is consistent with that ex-
pressed in the ABA Standards (and in the Preliminary Statement to the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility) that "The discipline to be imposed
should depend upon the specific facts and circumstances of the case, should be
fashioned in light of the purposes of lawyer discipline, and may take into ac-
count aggravating or mitigating circumstances.""
What has been the incidence of permanent disbarment in Ohio? The
Schroeder study indicates 11 of nearly 100 cases reaching the court (not involv-
ing reinstatement) resulted in permanent disbarment. Table 1, supra, indicates
that 36 of 250 cases reaching the supreme court resulted in permanent disbar.
ment - about fifteen percent. In addition, voluntary resignations, which, like
disbarment, are permanent, account for 115 self removals, or a total of 151 in-
stances of permanent removal from practice in the seventeen year period, or
approximately nine lawyers per year, on the average. The vigor of enforce-
ment in Ohio has not diminished since the Schroeder report, at least with
respect to egregious offenses, and, if anything, has increased.
For what reasons are lawyers permanently disbarred in the state? Two
cases involved disobedience to the order of indefinite suspension by the
respondents' practicing law.16 Sixteen cases involving seventeen lawyers were
predicated upon convictions of such serious crimes as: involvement in illegal
drug traffic in Florida;27 securing a writing by deception and misuse of funds in
a federal insured bank, as an officer thereof (involving more than $1 million);28
transporting bank money orders in interstate commerce knowing them to be
stolen ($110,000 face value); 9 grand theft from an estate;10 gross sexual imposi-
"ABA Standard 7.1.
'Toledo Bar Association v. Illman, 18 Ohio St. 2d 122, 247 N.E. 2d 758, cert. denied. 396 U.S. 986 (1969);
In re Edwards, 42 Ohio St. B.A. Rep. 1465 (Nov. 24, 1969).
"Ohio State Bar Association v. Orosz, 5 Ohio St. 3d 204, 449 N.E. 2d 1310 (1983).
'Disciplinary Counsel v. Kraft, 5 Ohio St. 3d 197, 449 N.E. 2d 1303 (1983).
'Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Bendis, 70 Ohio St. 2d 282, 436 N.E. 2d 1361 (1982).
"Toledo Bar Association v. McCreery, 69 Ohio St. 2d 359, 432 N.E. 2d 209 (1982).
[Vol. 18:3
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tion;3' murder of wife;32 embezzlement totaling in excess of $42,000 in one
case" and nearly $16,000 in another; ' offering and attempting to bribe a pros-
ecuting attorney;" counterfeiting and conspiracy to counterfeit;- altering
automobile identification and concealing motor vehicle identification;" convic-
tion of fifteen counts of use of the mails to defraud in the sale of registered
securities;38 a public official's conviction of soliciting and accepting money to
influence his official duties;39 larceny by trick involving three clients;1° use of
mails to execute a scheme to defraud, involving husband and wife as
respondents;' and selling nonexempt securities without a license and lending
money at usurious rates. 2
For the most part, the foregoing conduct was not in the capacity of the
respondent as a lawyer. However, the midconduct went to matters central to
character for the practice of law - honesty, trustworthiness and integrity.
They also had the quality of creating a "bad press" for the bar, and permanent
disbarment became a form of erasing the blot on the profession.43
Seventeen cases did not involve a prior conviction of a crime. Thirteen of
these involved mishandling clients' funds either in terms of commingling,
misuse, failure to account, or a combination thereof." Of the remaining four,
one involved the bilking of a savings and loan of which the lawyer was an of-
"'Cincinnati Bar Association v. Lisner, 65 Ohio St. 2d 62, 417 N.E. 2d 1381 (1981).
"Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Steele, 65 Ohio St. 2d I, 417 N.E. 2d 104 (1981).
"Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. McGarry, 60 Ohio St. 2d 168, 398 N.E. 2d 560 (1979).
'Lake County Bar Association v. Ostrander, 41 Ohio St. 2d 93, 322 N.E. 2d 653 (1975).
"
5Medina County Bar 'Association v. Haddad, 57 Ohio St. 2d II, 385 N.E. 2d 294 (1979).
'Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Esber, 48 Ohio St. 2d 231, 358 N.E. 2d 534 11976).
"Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Simpson, 48 Ohio St. 2d 120, 357 N.E. 2d 380 (1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 972 (1977).
"Ohio State Bar Association v. Mackay, 46 Ohio St. 2d 81, 346 N.E. 2d 302 (1976).
"Cleveland Bar Association v. Fatica, 28 Ohio St. 2d 40, 274 N.E. 2d 763 (1971).
'Cleveland Bar Association v. Corrigan, 25 Ohio St. 2d 290, 268 N.E. 2d 270 (1971).
"Toledo Bar Association v. Lichota, 15 Ohio St. 2d 217, 239 N.E. 2d 45 (1968).
"Cincinnati Bar Association v. Shott, 10 Ohio St. 2d 117, 226 N.E. 2d 724 (1967).
41See Grievance Committee v. Broder, 112 Conn. 269, 152 A. 292 (1930), (Attorney disbarred on conviction
of adultery). The court observed that the "public notoriety" of the case made it doubly imperative to
discipline the attorney, notwithstanding his excellent standing at the bar.
"Dayton Bar Association v. Herzog, 70 Ohio St. 2d 261, 436 N.E. 2d 1037, cert. denied. 459 U.S. 1016(1982); Toledo Bar Association v. Auwaerter, 69 Ohio St. 2d 85, 430 N.E. 2d 947 (1982); Dayton Bar
Association v. DeFrancis, 68 Ohio St. 2d 180, 429 N.E. 2d 443 (1981); Dayton Bar Association v. Prear, 68
Ohio St. 2d 42, 428 N.E. 2d 404 (1981); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Fennell, 63 Ohio St. 2d 113, 406 N.E.
2d 1129 (1980); Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Sato, 62 Ohio St. 2d 85, 403 N.E. 2d 199 (1980);
Ohio State Bar Association v. Talbott, 59 Ohio St. 2d 76, 391 N.E. 2d 1028 (1979); Cincinnati Bar Associa-
tion v. Lacinak, 46 Ohio St. 2d 393, 348 N.E. 2d 723 (1976); Ohio State Bar Association v. Weaver, 41 Ohio
St. 2d 97, 322 N.E. 2d 665 (1975); Ohio State Bar Association v. Kahn, 40 Ohio St. 2d 15, 317 N.E. 2d 913(1974); Muskingum County Bar Association v. Zwelling, 28 Ohio St. 2d 198, 277 N.E. 2d 427 (1971); Toledo
Bar Association v. Cone, 24 Ohio St. 2d 96, 264 N.E. 2d 909 (1970); Mahoning County Bar Association v.
Alexander, 22 Ohio St. 2d 22, 257 N.E. 2d 369 (1970).
7
Samad: Lawyer Discipline in Ohio
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1985
AKRON LAW REVIEW
ficer and conflict of interest in a commercial sense. 5
A second involved conflict of interest between the attorney and the
beneficiaries of an estate which he was handling, and commingling.0
A third involved gross neglect of one's practice (21 counts), commingling,
issuing "NSF" checks on the attorney's account, and failure to complete thirty-
two probate matters. 7
The final case involved several unrelated offenses - fraud in the at-
torney's voluntary bankruptcy petition, leaving his office in charge of a non-
lawyer who then engaged in unauthorized practice, and abusive use of legal
process against a client - clear indicators of an unprofessional attitude and
which cumulatively led to disbarment. 8
Although not involving criminal convictions, permanent disbarment
nonetheless was justified in the last series of cases by such aggravating factors
as a repetition of the misconduct,49 a collage of lesser offenses, each of which
alone would not justify disbarment but when aggregated indicate an unprofes-
sional attitude, 0 failing to appear and respond to the charges,5 the flagrancy of
the violation," failure to make prompt resitution," or prior sanction.'
These cases meet a test of disbarment in that they demonstrate an attitude
wholely inconsistent with the recognition of proper professional standards, or
as a single offense "so grave a nature as to be impossible to be a respectable
lawyer."5
In each of these cases, the supreme court has determined in advance that
the misconduct is so aggravated that the attorney not be given the opportunity
of a second chance through reinstatement. If one accepts the proposition of un-
-pardonable misconduct, then the court has acted fairly in these cases. The
" Cincinnati Bar Association v. Signer, 30 Ohio St. 2d 303, 285 N.E. 2d 10 (1972),cert. denied, 410 U.S. 934
19731.
'Toledo Bar Association v. Bartlett, 39 Ohio St. 2d 100, 313 N.E. 2d 834, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1073 11974).
"Ohio State Bar Association v. Willard, 50 Ohio St. 2d 3, 361 N.E. 2d 452 1977).
"Stark County Bar Association v. George, 45 Ohio St. 2d 267, 344 N.E. 2d 132 (1976).
'Ohio State Bar Association v. Willard, supra note 47.
"Stark County Bar Association v. George, supra note 48.
"'Ohio State Bar Association v. Talbott, 59 Ohio St. 2d 76, 391 N.E. 2d 1028 (1979) Ohio St. Bar Associa-
tion v. Willard, 50 Ohio St. 2d 3, 361 N.E. 2d 452 (1977).
'Mahoning County Bar Association v. Alexander, 22 Ohio St. 2d 22, 257 N.E. 2d 369 (1970).
"Toledo Bar Association v. Cone, 24 Ohio St. 2d 96, 264 N.E. 2d 909 (1970).
'Dayton Bar Association v. Herzog, 70 Ohio St. 2d 261, 436 N.E. 2d 1037, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016
11982) Iprior indefinite suspension); Dayton Bar Association v. DeFrancis, 68 Ohio St. 2d 180, 429 N.E. 2d
443 (1981) (prior public reprimand); Dayton Bar Association v. Prear, 68 Ohio St. 2d 42, 428 N.E. 2d 404
(1981) (prior indefinite suspension): Toledo Bar Association v. Ilman, 18 Ohio St. 2d 122, 247 N.E. 2d 758
11969) (prior indefinite suspensionl.
"H. DRINKER. LEGAL ErHIcs. 46-47 (1953).
[Vol. 18:3
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Ohio Supreme Court has delivered a message that it will exclude pemanently
from the bar not only serious criminal offenders, but the practitioner given to
repeated instances of misuse or mishandling of clients' funds or who is given to
chronic sloppy practice or who commits substantial violation of the terms of
his suspension. Those permanently disbarred do not appear to be the young
and inexperienced at the bar, but those admitted long enough to be seasoned
and to know better.56
INDEFINITE SUSPENSION
Both disbarment and suspension were available as sanctions to the court
prior to the structured, four tier system introduced by Rule XXVII in 1957;
however, those disbarred or suspended could be, and often were, reinstated."
The distinction between disbarment and suspension was thus semantic, not
functional, with disbarment suggesting that a more egregious offense had been
committed. As noted earlier, consistent with the philosophy of Ohio State Bar
Association President Boer, Rule XXVII introduced the notions of permanent
disbarment, and indefinite suspension subject to reinstatement, although both
notions ran contrary to prior practice and the subsequent ABA Standards.
Table I indicates that indefinite suspension has been the most frequent
form of sanction occurring during the seventeen year period of this study -
132 instances - of which some were interim suspensions following the convic-
tion of a serious crime,5" or the filing of a disciplinary action against a judge. s9
So in the Schroeder study was indefinite suspension the most frequent sanction
(39 cases). Of the 132 instances are 90 cases (involving 92 lawyers) in which in-
definite suspension was ordered as a final sanction, and these 90 cases are
discussed in this section.
A classification of offenses resulting in indefinite suspension appears in
Table II. Conviction of crimes involving moral turpitude (35 cases) was the
leading cause, of which income tax offenses (22 cases) was the largest subset.'
"Coen, A Look at Lawyer Discipline in Ohio, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 244 (1977). Attorney Coen, who was a Com-
missioner on the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, commented at page 250: "It is
not against the young and uninitiated practitioner that complaints have been filed. The average age of
lawyers involved in disciplinary hearings is fifty, each having practiced law an average of twenty-six years."
Six cases of the 36 disbarment cases used in this study give the year of admission of the lawyer. The
average length of time between the year of admission and the year of disbarment was nearly 20 years. The
longest period was 33 years, the shortest 9, and the median 17 years. The youngest in point of service was
convicted of concealing stolen motor vehicles and altering automobile identification.
"See cases cited supra note 12.
'Gov. R. V (8) (a):
Any attorney, admitted to the practice of law in this State who is convicted of an offense, other than a
petty offense as defined by the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, or who is convicted of an equiva-
lent offense under the laws of any other jurisdiction, shall be subject to an automatic indefinite
suspension.
'See, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Association v. Heitzler, 31 Ohio St. 2d 187, 287 N.E. 2d 632 (1972) 32 Ohio St. 2d
214, 291 N.E. 2d 477 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973); the first case involved an interim suspension
as a judge; the second, indefinite suspension as a final sanction as a lawyer.
'Criminal cases not involving income tax: Columbus Bar Association v. Tarmey, 4 Ohio St. 3d 8I, 446 N.E.
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Significantly, not one of these cases involved a client as the victim, and that
fact served to mitigate the offense, vis-a-vis disbarment. Further, the crimes
were less serious than those involved in disbarment.'
Neglect of a client's cause and failure to seek his lawful objectives, involv-
ing 23 cases, ranked second to criminal offenses in terms of frequency. These
were not isolated instances of neglect or failure to act, but cases compounded
by repetition of the misconduct or by misleading a client as to the status of the
case, or involving a failure to account for funds received from the client, or
other aggravating factors.62 Significantly, more than half of the neglect cases
2d I 120 (1983) (repeated pettit theft); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Levin, 3 Ohio St. 3d 25,445 N.E. 2d 661(1983) (trafficking in drugs); Columbus Bar Association v. Gross, 2 Ohio St. 3d 5, 441 N.E. 2d 570 (1982) (is-
suing numerous bad checks to defraud); Columbus Bar Association v. Gloeckner, I Ohio St. 3d 83, 437 N.E.
2d 1197 (1982) (complicity to bribe a witness); Portage County Bar Association v. Miller, 70 Ohio St. 2d 162,
436 N.E. 2d 217 (1982) (grand theft and gambling); Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Chvosta, 62
Ohio St. 2d 429, 406 N.E. 2d 524 (1980) (felonious assault, two counts); Bar Association of Greater
Cleveland v. Zaffiro, 61 Ohio St. 2d 69, 399 N.E. 2d 549 (1980) (tampering with public records); Bar Associa-
tion of Greater Cleveland v. Cassaro, 61 Ohio St. 2d 62, 399 N.E. 2d 545 (1980) (attempted tampering with
public records); Columbus Bar Association v. Newsom, 59 Ohio St. 2d 56, 391 N.E. 2d 741 (1979) (filing
false insurance claim for self); Dayton Bar Association v. Harrison, 58 Ohio St. 2d 197, 389 N.E. 2d 845
(1979) (conspiracy to deal in firearms for South Africa and Rhodesia); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Klatch,
25 Ohio St. 2d 241, 267 N.E. 2d 810 (1971) (convicted of receiving stolen property, and other civil offenses,
cumulative misconduct and "bad press"); Cleveland Bar Association v. Zimmerman, 21 Ohio St. 169, 256
N.E. 2d 713 (1970) (conspiracy to embezzle money from the Small Business Administration).
Cases involving tax fraud, filing false return: Dayton Bar Association v. Carter, 40 Ohio St. 2d 43, 319
N.E. 2d 358 (1974); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Bowman, 15 Ohio St. 2d 220, 239 N.E. 2d 47 (1968).
Cases involving willful failure to file tax returns: Columbus Bar Association v. Dunbar, 62 Ohio St. 2d
360, 405 N.E. 2d 1040 (1980); Ohio State Bar Association v. Stimmel 61 Ohio St. 2d 316, 401 N.E. 2d 926(1980); Butler County Bar Association v. Bartels, 58 Ohio St. 2d 260, 389 N.E. 2d 1141 (1979); Cincinnati
Bar Association v. Pandildis, 57 Ohio St. 2d 47, 385 N.E. 2d 1317 (1979); Dayton Bar Association v.
Westbrock, 56 Ohio St. 2d 75, 381 N.E. 2d 1320 (1978); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Beall, 54 Ohio St. 2d
168, 375 N.E. 2d 423 (1978); Stark County Bar Association v. Bernabei, 46 Ohio St. 2d 455, 349 N.E. 2d 300(1976); Ohio State Bar Association v. Tzagournis, 46 Ohio St. 2d 367, 348 N.E. 2d 690 (1976); Ohio State
Bar Association v. Vaporis, 46 Ohio St. 2d 364, 348 N.E. 2d 689 (1976); Dayton Bar Association v. Kern, 46
Ohio St. 2d 342, 348 N.E. 2d 707 (1976); Dayton Bar Association v. Moore, 46 Ohio St. 2d 241, 348 N.E. 2d
318 (1976); Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Kates, 46 Ohio St. 2d 34, 346 N.E. 2d 297 (1976); Ohio
State Bar Association v. Moore, 45 Ohio St. 2d 57, 341 N.E. 2d 302, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 924 (1976);
Dayton Bar Association v. Radabaugh, 43 Ohio St. 2d 155, 331 N.E. 2d 410(1975); Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion v. Tekulve, 42 Ohio St. 2d 285, 328 N.E. 405 (1975); Columbus Bar Association v. Dixon, 40 Ohio St.
2d 76, 320 N.E. 2d 293 (1974); Ohio State Bar Association v. Gerken, 40 Ohio St. 2d 51, 320 N.E. 2d 657(1974); Cleveland Bar Association v. Stein, 29 Ohio St. 2d 77, 278 N.E. 2d 670, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949(1972); Cleveland Bar Association v. Acker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 18, 278 N.E. 2d 32 (1972); Ohio State Bar
Association v. Hart, 15 Ohio St. 2d 97, 238 N.E. 2d 560, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933 (1968).
"Cf., Ohio State Bar Association v. Orosz, 5 Ohio St. 3d 204, 449 N.E. 2d 1310 (1983) (disbarment, heavily
involved with Florida drug traffic) with Cincinnati Bar Association v. Levin, 3 Ohio St. 3d 25, 445 N.E. 2d
661 t1983) (indefinite suspension, trafficking in drugs; in drug rehabilitation program) and Cleveland Bar
Association v. Corrigan, 25 Ohio St. 2d 290, 268 N.E. 2d 270 (1971) (disbarment, larceny by trick and
embezzlement of funds belonging to client) with Cleveland Bar Association v. Zimmerman, 21 Ohio St. 2d
169, 256 N.E. 2d 713 (1970) (indefinite suspension, conspiracy to embezzle money from a federal agency).
612Mahoning County Bar Association v. Walsh, 8 Ohio St. 3d 32, 456 N.E. 2d 1206 (1983); Mahoning Coun-
ty Bar Association v. Kelly, 4 Ohio St. 3d 188, 447 N.E. 2d 1304 (1983); Disciplinary Counsel v. Hiller. 5
Ohio St. 3d 237, 450 N.E. 2d 1157 (1983); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Ebel, 5 Ohio St. 3d 145, 449 N.E.
2d 456 (1983); In re Petition for Atkins, 2 Ohio St. 3d 32, 442 N.E. 2d 754 (1982) (suspended in 1979); Stark
County Bar Association v. Ergazos, 2 Ohio St. 2d 59, 442 N.E. 2d 1286 (1982) (prior public reprimand); Day-
ton Bar Association v. Moore, 2 Ohio St. 3d II, 442 N.E. 2d 71 (1982); Columbus Bar Association v. Ham-
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(13 in number) were adjudicated during the last three years of this study
(1981-1983, inclusive), and may well suggest an effort be made by the bar to
determine the causes.63
Mishandling of funds or property of a client, or commingling or failure or
inability to account for funds or property, or a combination thereof accounted
for 19 cases,64 and were sometimes connected with neglect of the client's cause.
Like the disbarment cases, many involved repeated instances of mishandling of
money or property, but unlike the disbarment cases were not accompanied by
a prior criminal conviction, nor were they of the same magnitude or flagrancy.
Conflict of interest offenses accounted for 4 cases, in which an attorney abused
a confidence or resource of a client for the benefit of self, a second client, or a
friend.65
Solicitation accounted for 2 cases, one of which reached the Supreme
inersmith, 69 Ohio St. 2d 77, 430 N.E. 2d 1329 (1982); Toledo Bar Association v. Merillat, 68 Ohio St. 2d
146, 429 N.E. 2d 158 (1981); Cincinnati Bar Association v. McConnell, 68 Ohio St. 2d 60, 428 N.E. 2d 414
(198 1); Ohio State Bar Association v. Lowe, 67 Ohio St. 2d 335, 423 N.E. 2d 867 (198 1); Akron Bar Associa-
tion v. Wise, 66 Ohio St. 2d 229, 421 N.E. 2d 148 (1981) (prior public reprimand); Dayton Bar Association v.
Delcontivo, 66 Ohio St. 2d 109, 420 N.E. 2d 113 (1981); Dayton Bar Association v. Stinchfield, 65 Ohio St.
2d 130, 418 N.E. 2d 1366 (1981); Dayton Bar Association v. Atkins, 58 Ohio St. 2d 194, 389 N.E. 2d 506
(1979); Ohio State Bar Association v. Renshaw, 49 Ohio St. 2d 192, 360 N.E. 2d 703 (1977); Cincinnati Bar
Association v. Carter, 48 Ohio St. 2d 227, 357 N.E. 2d 1099 (1976); Stark County Bar Association v.
Lukens, 48 Ohio St. 2d 187, 357 N.E. 2d 1083 (1976); Akron Bar Association v. Holt, 46 Ohio St. 2d 223,
348 N.E. 2d 334 (1976); Lake County Bar Association v. Johnson, 26 Ohio St. 2d 28, 268 N.E. 2d 285
(1971); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Coogan, 21 Ohio St. 2d 147, 256 N.E. 2d 218, cert. denied. 400 U.S.
866 (1970); Ohio State Bar Association v. Epling, 15 Ohio St. 2d 23, 238 N.E. 2d 558, cert. denied, 393 U.S.
933 (1968) (prior public reprimand for careless practice, and uttering numerous worthless checks); Cleveland
Bar Association v. O'Malley, 12 Ohio St. 2d 35, 231 N.E. 2d 311 (1967) (prior public reprimand in 1964).
"Lawyer population doubled between 1974 and 1983, but the number of indefinite suspensions tripled. In
addition, several cases of neglect appear in terms of one year suspensions. Causes of increased incidence of
neglect may be a greater willingness on the part of clients to complain, or a greater incidence of neglect or
both. Alcohol abuse appears in three post- 1980 cases, and two pre- 1981 cases. Physical disability was a cause
in one pre-1981 case. Disciplinary authorities and professional associations should be concerned in learning
the causes.
"Toledo Bar Association v. DeMars, 6 Ohio St. 3d 12, 450 N.E. 2d 1168 (1983); Bar Association of Greater
Cleveland v. Schnittger, 3 Ohio St. 3d 26, 445 N.E. 2d 662 (1983); Butler County Bar Association v. Green,
I Ohio St. 3d 48, 438 N.E. 2d 406 (1982); Columbus Bar Association v. Pfefferle, 65 Ohio St. 2d 4 (1981);
Columbus Bar Association v. Amos, 62 Ohio St. 2d 256, 405 N.E. 2d 271 (1980); Bar Association of Greater
Cleveland v. Canales, 62 Ohio St. 2d 207, 404 N.E. 2d 750 (1980); Columbus Bar Association v. Robinson,
59 Ohio St. 2d 62, 391 N.E. 2d 1019 (1979); Ohio State Bar Association v. Bradley, 56 Ohio St. 2d 123, 383
N.E. 2d 122 (1978); Akron Bar Association v. Hughes, 46 Ohio St. 2d 369, 348 N.E. 2d 712 (1976); Toledo
Bar Association v. Ishler, 44 Ohio St. 2d 204, 339 N.E. 2d 828 (1975); Columbus Bar Association v. Tuttle,
41 Ohio St. 2d 183, 324 N.E. 2d 753 (1975); Columbus Bar Association v. Lowe, 29 Ohio St. 2d 144, 280
N.E. 2d 374 (1972); Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Stanard, 45 Ohio St. 2d 59, 340 N.E. 2d 847
(1976); Ohio State Bar Association v. Roest, 54 Ohio St. 2d 95, 374 N.E. 2d 1366 (1978); Columbus Bar
Association v. Allison, 20 Ohio St. 2d 147, 254 N.E. 2d 366 (1969); Toledo Bar Association v. llman, 18
Ohio St. 2d 122, 247 N.E. 2d 758 (1969) (disbarred in 1976 for practicing law while under suspension); Ohio
State Bar Association v. l1lman, 45 Ohio St. 2d 159, 342 N.E. 2d 688, (1976); Toledo Bar Association v.
Jacobs, 13 Ohio St. 2d 147, 235 N.E. 2d 230 (1968); Columbus Bar Association v. Edwards, I I Ohio St. 2d
171, 228 N.E. 2d 626 (1967).
"Stark County Bar Association v. Osborne, I Ohio St. 3d 140, 438 N.E. 2d 114 (1982); Bar Association of
Greater Cleveland v. Watkins, 68 Ohio St. 2d 1l, 427 N.E. 2d 516 (1981); Bar Association of Greater
Cleveland v. Shillman, 61 Ohio St. 2d 364, 402 N.E. 2d 514 (1980); Toledo Bar Association v. Miller, 22
Ohio St. 2d 7, 257 N.E. 2d 376 (1970).
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Court of the United States." Ohio continued its policy of dealing severely with
ambulance chasing and other forms of aggressive business-getting. 7
The ploy of exacting an excessive fee by suggesting that the money was
needed to influence a public official or tribunal was dealt with severely in 2
cases, although no money changed hands."
The 6 cases labelled "Miscellaneous" are self-explanatory.69
Several of the foregoing cases involving a single instance offense not in-
volving serious criminal misconduct are difficult to justify as meriting in-
definite suspension. For example, Bednarczuk's venting his spleen against a
common pleas judge by a scurrilous attack merited a sanction, but hardly in-
definite suspension, since it did not occur in the judge's courtroom or in a case
pending before him by one, a first offender, whose conduct otherwise was
found to be good.7" So in the aggravated menace case by a lawyer, irate over a
judge's ruling, who became drunk, pointed a gun "in the direction of' (not "at")
the judge's bailiff and fired." A public reprimand was certainly in order at this
point. But the attorney, who one presumed was now sober, foolishly wrote a
letter to the judge suggesting that the judge influence the bailiff to dismiss pro-
ceedings pending against the lawyer, thus exacerbating his offense. The 20
cases involving willful failure to file federal income tax returns were dealt with
uniformly by indefinite suspension, apart from any mitigating circumstances,
since a public reprimand was ineffective either to deter similar offenses or to
expiate the "bad press" that such cases engender.72
Solicitation cases were similarly dealt with unduly harshly by imposing in-
"Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Protus, 53 Ohio St. 2d 43, 372 N.E. 2d 344 (1978) (also involved
fee splitting with a layman); Ohio State Bar Association v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 357 N.E. 2d 1097(1976), aftd., 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
"
7See Columbus Bar Association v. Agee, 175 Ohio St. 443, 196 N.E. 2d 98 (1964) (indefinite suspension);
Columbus Bar Association v. Potts, 175 Ohio St. 101, 191 N.E. 2d 728 (1963) (indefinite suspension);
Dayton Bar Association v. Kemper, 175 Ohio St. 285, 194 N.E. 2d 431 (1963) (indefinite suspension);
Cleveland Bar Association v. Fleck, 172 Ohio St. 467, 178 N.E. 2d 782 (196 1) (involved three attorneys in
partnership, each indefinitely suspended).
"Columbus Bar Association v. Benis, 5 Ohio St. 3d 199, 449 N.E. 2d 1305 (1983); Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion v. Consoldane, 50 Ohio St. 2d 337, 364 N.E. 2d 279 (1977).
"Lake County Bar Association v. Baxter, 4 Ohio St. 3d 82, 446 N.E. 2d 1121 (1983) (check kiting); Toledo
Bar Association v. Fell, 51 Ohio St. 2d 33, 364 N.E. 2d 872 (1977) (failed to inform the court of status of
case, to earn larger fee); Cuyahoga County Bar Association v. Whitaker, 42 Ohio St. 2d I, 325 N.E. 2d 889
(1975) (failure to terminate relationship where client had no valid claim); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Bed-
narczuk, 22 Ohio St. 2d 99, 258 N.E. 2d 116 (1970) (scurrilous written attacks on judge outside courtroom);
Toledo Bar Association v. Kolby, 22 Ohio St. 2d 185, 259 N.E. 2d I11 (1970) (suggestion to a private in-
vestigator to influence a witness on behalf of respondent's client. Board's recommendation of conditional
suspension rejected); Dayton Bar Association v. Weiner, 40 Ohio St. 2d 7, 317 N.E. 2d 783 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975) (placing self-interest over client's, disobedience to court order.
"Cincinnati Bar Association v. Bednarczuk, supra note 69.
"Cincinnati Bar Association v. Chacksfield, 50 Ohio St. 2d 305, 364 N.E. 2d 260 (1977).
"Cincinnati Bar Association v. Bowman, 15 Ohio St. 2d 220, 239 N.E. 2d 47 (1968) (newspaper clippings
were introduced in evidence and were relevant to show that respondent's conviction of tax fraud brought the
legal profession into disrepute).
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definite suspension, as observed heretofore. 3 Ohralik's approach of an accident
victim in her hospital room was an imposition, but unless such conduct was
habitual,"' or aggravated, it hardly merited indefinite suspension. A one year
suspension, or less, would have been in order. But Ohio afforded no level of
sanction between public reprimand and indefinite suspension, at least until
1981, before which seventy-one indefinite suspensions were ordered.
ONE YEAR SUSPENSION
Effective January 1, 1981, a suspension for the fixed period of one year
was authorized. Reinstatement is not automatic, for an application is required.
The applicant must state under oath whether or not any formal disciplinary
proceedings are pending against him, must have complied with the order of
suspension and must have paid all costs of proceedings as ordered by the
court." If the foregoing conditions are met, he will be reinstated.
On reinstatement, he is faced with the provisions of Government Rule
V(7) that
A person who has been suspended for a period of one year from the prac-
tice of law... upon being found guilty of subsequent misconduct shall be
suspended for an indefinite period or permanently disbarred, depending
on the seriousness of the misconduct.
There is in Rule V no limitation on the time of the running of this effect, nor a
provision for expunction. Therefore, it is lifelong, contrary to ABA Standard
6.7 that provides: "Probation should be imposed for a specified period of time
not to exceed two years."
The Board has over the first three year period recommended one year
suspensions in 15 cases. The court has approved the recommendation in each
case. Additionally, the court has increased a recommended public reprimand
'"See supra note 66.
"
4Cf. the use of lay agents in worker's compensation cases where indefinite suspensions were ordered: Colum-
bus Bar Association v. Agee, and Columbus Bar Association v. Potts, supra note 67; cf. also Cleveland Bar
Association v. Fleck, supra note 67, (involving solicitation in connection with a labor union), with Ohio
State Bar Association v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976) (solicitation stemming from a
single accident).
"Gov. R. V(22):
Suspension for One-Year Period: Reinstatement. At the expiration of a suspension for a period of one
year, the Respondent shall be reinstated to the practice of law, upon application by the Respondent.
Said application shall be in writing and filed with the Clerk of this Court. It shall indicate the date
such suspension was ordered, shall include an affidavit by Respondent indicating whether any formal
disciplinary proceedings are pending against said Respondent, and request reinstatement pursuant to
this rule. This Court shall order said Respondent reinstated, provided that all costs of the proceedings
as ordered by the Court have been paid, that the Respondent has complied with the order of suspen-
sion, and that no formal disciplinary proceedings are pending against Respondent. The Clerk of this
Court shall provide notice of such reinstatement to all persons or organizations who received copies of
the disciplinary order of this Court ordering Respondent's suspension.
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to a one year suspension in 3 instances during this period,76 and reduced a
recommended indefinite suspension to a one year suspension in only 1 in-
stance." Thus, there were 19 cases in which this sanction was the final remedy
during the period of 1981-1983, inclusive.
A tabulation of this sanction by type of offense is as follows:
Prior Criminal Conviction 7
Willful Failure to File Income Tax Return 5
Other
Unauthorized use of property 1
Aggravated assault 1
Mishandling Funds Intended for Client 6
Neglect of Client's Cause 3
Miscellaneous 3
Conflict of Interest I
Disrespect for Court I
Sexual Assault on Client 1
The most immediate beneficiaries of this sanction were five lawyers guilty
of willful failure to file an income tax return 8 whose cases were before the
court after 1981. The Stein rule, 79 adopted in 1972, mandated indefinite
suspension, even in the presence of mitigating circumstances. In Columbus
Bar Association v. Wolfe,80 decided in 1982, the court declined to follow Stein
in view of the recently authorized one year suspension, when mitigating cir-
cumstances were present. The mitigating circumstances were the absence of
harm to a client and such things as physical and emotional problems, marital
discord, illness and the like. Few, if any, cases of failure to file a lawyer's per-
sonal income tax return harm a client and rare is the case that does not involve
a mitigating factor; severe emotional problems and marital discord (Wolfe);
debilitating personal and family problems (Mittendor); a former public servant
with a good record, cooperative, with a wife in failing health (Loha); a good
record of honesty and integrity and back taxes paid (Zitt); and an earlier
"Sanctions of public reprimand were increased to one year suspensions by the court in the following: Bar
Association of Greater Cleveland v. Carlin, 67 Ohio St. 2d 311, 423 N.E. 2d 477 (198 1) (use of vulgarity and
profanity during criminal trial); Lake County Bar Association v. Needham, 66 Ohio St. 2d 116, 419 N.E. 2d
1104 (1981) (neglect with reference to three clients); Mahoning County Bar Association v. Walsh, 66 Ohio
St. 177, 420 N.E. 2d 1003 (1981) (failed to prosecute, did not refund fee, when dismissed, he filed suit).
"Toledo Bar Association v. Kitchen, 69 Ohio St. 2d 338, 432 N.E. 2d 195 (1982) (attempting to sell
stenotype machine for relative when relative did not have title - unauthorized use of property).
"Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Litt, 5 Ohio St. 3d 98, 449 N.E. 2d 429 (1983); Ohio State Bar
Association v. Loha, 4 Ohio St. 3d 190, 447 N.E. 2d 1306 (1983); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Mittendorf,
4 Ohio St. 3d 123, 447 N.E. 2d 103 (1983); Columbus Bar Association v. Wolfe, 70 Ohio St. 2d 55,434 N.E.
2d 1096 (1982); Columbus Bar Association v. McClure, 70 Ohio St. 2d 55, 434 N.E. 2d 1096 (1982).
'Cleveland Bar Association v. Stein, 29 Ohio St. 2d 77, 278 N.E. 2d 670 (1972).
'See supra note 78.
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suicide of a dependent, the attorney being a person held in high esteem, who
had made substantial restitution (McClure).
Wolfe is likely to become the new norm of one year suspensions in cases
of willful failure to file federal tax returns absent an aggravating factor, such as
the "tax protestor."8'
The 2 remaining cases, 2 involving criminal convictions, concerned an at-
tempt to sell a stenotype machine on behalf of a relative to which the relative
did not have title, and an aggravated assault case. Although these offenses may
well result in indefinite suspension, the stenotype sales case involved, accord-
ing to the court, no attorney client relationship, and in the single court assault
case, the attorney had a good record who was given to a sudden emotional ex-
plosion not likely to reoccur. Justice Kurpanski disagreed as a minority of one
in the latter case.
The 683 cases involving mishandling of property intended for clients or
belonging to clients which resulted in one year suspensions are distinguishable
from the indefinite suspension cases in that they were single episodes, and did
not involve an act of commingling. In one, there were mitigating factors such
as substantial restitution and cooperation with the relator."4
Neglect appeared in 3 cases: "Shortcutting" in one (signing grantor's name
to deed and notarizing it, but not for personal gain, followed by failure to file
the deed); 5 failure to render service to three clients that did not involve per-
sonal gain, and failure to remove himself from a case at the behest of the
client; and a single episode of neglect in a third, compounded by the receipt of
a part of the fee in advance, failure to refund the money, and when discharged
from the case, nonetheless filing a complaint. 7
Among the 3 remaining cases, a conflict of interest appeared when an at-
torney, representing the lender, effected a loan to a third party borrower, and
received a finder's fee shared with two others, paid by the borrower.8 The bor-
rower failed to make payments on the loan. The lender was unaware of the at-
"Cleveland Bar Association v. Acker, 29 Ohio St. 2d 18, 278 N.E. 2d 32 (1972).
"Toledo Bar Association v. Kitchen, 69 Ohio St. 2d 338, 432 N.E. 2d 195 (1982) (unauthorized use of prop-
erty, a stenotype machine); Columbus Bar Association v. Harris, I Ohio St. 3d 33, 437 N.E. 2d 596 (1982)
(aggravated assault).
"Ohio State Bar Association v. Sacher, 8 Ohio St. 3d 49, 457 N.E. 2d 815 (1983); Ohio State Bar Association
v. Cantagallo, 6 Ohio St. 3d 10, 451 N.E. 2d 224 (1983); Disciplinary Counsel v. Morton, 5 Ohio St. 3d 206,
450 N.E. 2d 275 (1983); Akron Bar Association v. Jaynes, 70 Ohio St. 2d 276, 436 N.E. 2d 1359 (1982);
Akron Bar Association v. Goodlet, 70 Ohio St. 2d 140, 435 N.E. 2d 1116 (1982); Ohio State Bar Association
v. York, 66 Ohio St. 2d 485, 423 N.E. 2d 121 (1981).
"Akron Bar Association v. Goodlet, supra note 83.
"Ohio State Bar Association v. Weisenberger, 68 Ohio St. 2d 1, 426 N.E. 2d 790 (1981).
"tLake County Bar Association v. Needham, 66 Ohio St. 2d 116, 419 N.E. 2d 1104 (1981).
"'Mahoning County Bar Association v. Walsh, 66 Ohio St. 2d 177, 420 N.E. 2d 1003 (1981).
UBar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Nesbitt, 69 Ohio St. 2d 108, 431 N.E. 2d 323 (1982).
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torney's receipt of the fee.
A second case involved vulgarities and profanities during a criminal trial,
which, inter alia, disparaged the judge.89 The defense that the judge used pro-
fanity during the trial did not excuse trial attorney's misconduct. The Board
had recommended a public reprimand. That, in the author's judgment, offered
a fairer result. However, the supreme court appears highly protective of the
judiciary in this and other cases.10
Sexual assault of two female persons during scheduled visits is indicative
of a seriously deficient professional attitude. However, an offer of evidence
that the attorney was suffering from mental illness at the time of the offense
served to mitigate, but not to excuse, the misconduct.9
But for Carlin,92 involving vulgarities and obscenities during a criminal
trial in which the judge also used profanity, the sanction of a one year suspen-
sion was commensurate with the offense.
PUBLIC REPRIMAND
Sixty-two public reprimands have been issued during the seventeen year
period of this study, of which 21 appear in 19 reported cases. Public reprimand
functions as a caution to the offending lawyer and to the bar through reported
cases that certain conduct involves sufficiently substantial violation of the
rules to merit disapprobation, but not so aggravated as to merit an interruption
of a lawyer's professional career.
Offenses for which public reprimand have been given include:
* Two cases of conviction of petty or non-serious misdemeanor;93
* Six cases involving a conflict of interest between attorney and client;"
'"Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Carlin, 67 Ohio St. 2d 311, 423 N.E. 2d 477 (1981).
'See, e.g.. Cincinnati Bar Association v. Bednarczuk, 22 Ohio St. 2d 99, 258 N.E. 2d 116 (1970). Respondent
filed a scurriless pleading against a state judge in the U.S. district court, and published a book, "Glorious
Larceny," maliciously attacking the judge. He was indefinitely suspended even though a first offender with a
good record.
"'Cincinnati Bar Association v. Fettner, 8 Ohio St. 3d 17, 455 N.E. 2d 1288 (1983).
2Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Carlin, supra note 89.
"Cincinnati Bar Association v. Leroux, 16 Ohio St. 2d 10, 242 N.E. 2d 347 (1968) (involving three attorneys
for willful failure to file tax returns, a misdemeanor); and Akron Bar Association v. Murty, 62 Ohio St. 2d
301, 405 N.E. 2d 300 (1980) (obtaining an HUD loan by falsely representing the proceeds were to improve
property A, but proceeds were used to buy property B. The offense was considered "petty or minor").
"Lake County Bar Association v. Gargiulo, 62 Ohio St. 2d 239, 404 N.E. 2d 1343 (1980) (lending money to
client and overreaching); Dayton Bar Association v. Gunnoe, 64 Ohio St. 2d 172, 413 N.E. 2d 842 (1980)
(while acting as attorney, sold client's business to self and others without adequate protection of client's in-
terest, but made good the loss); Lake County Bar Association v. Patterson, 64 Ohio St. 2d 163, 413 N.E. 2d
840 (1980) (client invested money in a corporation in which attorney had an interest, without informing
client of interest, but attorney found not to have acted maliciously or for gain); Columbus Bar Association v.
Ramey, 32 Ohio St. 2d 91, 290 N.E. 2d 831 (1972) (attorney named self as sole legatee in will of a stranger,
and trustee of an intervivos irrevocable trust, without full disclosure of implications to client; no funds were
misused and attorney fully accounted for them); Muskingum County Bar Association v. Tanner, 29 Ohio St.
2d 21, 278 N.E. 2d 21 (1972) (taking fee unilaterally from client's property); Columbus Bar Association v.
16
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" One case involving a conflict of interest between two clients;9"
" Three cases of neglect of, or mishandling, client's cases, but not involv-
ing dishonesty or malfeasance; 96
" Two cases of filing a false suit or harassing pleadings;97
" One case involved misuse of clients' funds, but without loss to client; 98
" One case of obscenities in oral and written communication with an
adversary;"
" One case of withdrawal from a case without taking steps to protect the
client's interests;' ®
* One case of knowingly taking part for a fee in a scheme to defraud that
involved an offer to sell back to the owner or insurer a truck known to
have been stolen, though respondent had been acquitted of criminal
charges;' °0
" One case involving misconduct by an acting Municipal Judge. Having
set bail for the accused, he later appeared as his representative at a
preliminary hearing and arraignment. 2 In a second matter, he set bail
for the accused, personally effected his release, and thereafter reduced
bail at the request of counsel.0 3
With the exception of the early cases involving a willful failure to file a
federal tax return, the public reprimand cases can be distinguished from the
earlier indefinite suspension cases and more recently, the one year suspension
cases by the following factors:
9 A minor or petty offense and not a felony was involved;' °
Nachman, 8 Ohio St. 2d 47, 247 N.E. 2d 289 (1966) (client claimed a fund in attorney's hands was in trust;
attorney claimed as fee; evidence in dispute; parties settled after complaint filed; attorney was not as frank,
candid or forthright as he should have been).
9Columbus Bar Association v. Grelle, 14 Ohio St. 2d 208, 237 N.E. 2d 298 (1968) (dual representation of
husband and wife in a divorce followed by dispute as to a personal injury claim settled after divorce; wife
claimed interest; attorney sided with husband when he should have withdrawn).
'Dayton Bar Association v. Timen, 62 Ohio St. 2d 357,405 N.E. 2d 1038 (1980); Ohio State Bar Association
v. Alexander, 44 Ohio St. 2d II, 335 N.E. 2d 867 (1975) (restored client's loss from own resources);
Cleveland Bar Association v. McGinty, 18 Ohio St. 2d 71, 247 N.E. 2d 459 (1969) (four complaints; statute
of limitations permitted to run against one claim; no affirmative dishonesty or malfeasance found).
97Ohio Bar Association v. Gebhart, 69 Ohio St. 2d 287, 431 N.E. 2d 1031 (1982) (filed a counterclaim to a
suit seeking disbarment of two opponents, without merit); Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Haffner,
52 Ohio St. 2d 41, 368 N.E. 2d 845 (1977) (filed suit against client for reimbursement of medical bills, got a
default judgement and garnishment order; he did not pay the bills until after suit filed; attorney denied any
intent to defraud).
9Columbus Bar Association v. Thompson, 69 Ohio St. 2d 667, 433 N.E. 2d 602 (1982).
"Columbus Bar Association v. Riebel, 69 Ohio St. 2d 290, 432 N.E. 2d 165 (1982) (obscenities occurred in
three written and one oral communication).
"'Akron Bar Association v. Johnstone, 54 Ohio St. 2d 485, 377 N.E. 2d 790 (1971). In addition to improper
withdrawal, a second count indicated a neglect of a legal matter.
'Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Sandier, 51 Ohio St. 2d 132, 364 N.E. 2d 1168 (1977).
'
02Ohio State Bar Association v. Gibson, 55 Ohio St. 2d 99, 377 N.E. 2d 751 (1978).
1031d.
"°Akron Bar Association v. Murty, supra note 93.
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" Where fraud was involved, it was minor;0 5
" The client did not suffer a financial loss;
" Or the loss was made good;07
" The misconduct was an isolated instance and not a pattern of repeated
misconduct;0
" Or, if the conduct was repeated, it involved no affirmative dishonesty or
malfeasance;109
" Each offender was a first offender (had there been a prior public repri-
mand or one year suspension, the minimum sanction would have been
indefinite suspension)." 0
The court dealt leniently with the early instances of willful failure to file a
federal tax return, since it looked for, but did not find, a specific intent to
defraud." Subsequently in Stein, " 2 the court ordered indefinite suspension for
willful failure to file a federal tax return, but in Wolfe,"' cut the sanction back
to a one year suspension. In the other reported instances, the court dealt fairly
with the offender.
Reprimand is a humane sanction that is universally recognized. The prob-
lem in Ohio is the continuing effect of the sanction over the attorney's entire
career." 4 Thus, an attorney who is once given a public reprimand, who serves
responsibly for many years and commits a second act warranting a reprimand,
is doomed minimally to indefinite suspension, since a public reprimand and a
public reprimand equal indefinite suspension" 5 or permanent disbarment, de-
pending on the seriousness of the offense. The solution to this concern is to
limit its effect to two years, or to permit expunction after two years of good
conduct.
DISMISSAL OF CHARGES AND REDUCTION OF SANCTION
By the time a disciplinary complaint is certified by the Board to the court
1USId.; Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Haffner, supra note 97.
"' Columbus Bar Association v. Thompson, supra note 98.
'uOhio State Bar Association v. Alexander, supra note 96.
ImId
"
"'Cleveland Bar Association v. McGinty, supra note 96.
"
0Butler County Bar Association v. Green, I Ohio St. 3d 48, 438 N.E. 2d 406 (1982).
"'Cincinnati Bar Association v. Leroux, supra note 93.
"Cleveland Bar Association v. Stein, 29 Ohio St. 2d 77, 278 N.E. 2d 670, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
'Columbus Bar Association v. Wolfe, 70 Ohio St. 2d 55, 434 N.E. 2d 1096 (1982).
"'Gov. R. V: "A person ... who has been publicly reprimanded for misconduct, upon being found guilty of
subsequent misconduct, shall be suspended indefinitely or permanently disbarred, depending upon the
seriousness of the misconduct."
"'See Butler County Bar Association v. Green (Ohio State Bar Association v. Green), I Ohio St. 3d 48, 438
N.E. 2d 406 (1982). A prior public reprimand precludes a subsequent one year suspension where there is
misconduct (neglect) following the first reprimand; Akron Bar Association v. Wise, 66 Ohio St. 2d 229, 421
N.E. 2d 148 (1981).
[Vol. 18:3
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with a finding of commission of one or more offenses and a recommended
sanction, the complaint has been screened by a bar association grievance com-
mittee or the Office of Disciplinary Counsel or both, a hearing panel of the
Board, and the Board en banc, each of which is authorized to dismiss the com-
plaint. With three levels of screening, it is not surprising that the supreme
court has dismissed few complaints for insufficiency of the complaint or of the
evidence. Schroeder" 6 reported only two dismissals at the level of the court;
this study found only one,"' for a total of only three in a twenty-seven year
period.
The court may modify the sanction upwards or downwards as well as
dismiss the complaint. Schroeder reported twelve modifications, five by way of
increase, seven by way of decrease, during his study of the first ten years under
the reformed rules."'
This author observes that the court, during the seventeen year period of
this study: increased the sanction in fourteen cases; decreased it in six; and re-
jected conditional suspension in three instances, ordering indefinite suspen-
sions to be entered.
These data suggest that, while the court is not a rubber stamp, it accords
the Board's findings and recommendations great weight. The court will affirm
the findings of guilt of an offenders nearly 100% of the time (99.6% to be ex-
act) and the sanction about 90% of the time.
These data suggest that a respondent's contest at the level of the court is
in a real sense a contest over sanctions not guilt or innocence to the commis-
sion of some offense. To the extent that individual charges may be shown to be
unsubstantiated, the more likely the opportunity to win a reduction of the
sanction. But there are risks in cases other than disbarment, that the sanction
may be increased.
Cases in which disbarment is ordered carry no upside risk, other than loss
of costs and counsel fees. In only three instances has a recommendation of per-
manent disbarment been reduced to a lesser sanction, two reported by
Schroeder,"9 and one occurring during the next seventeen years.2 0
""Schroeder, supra note 10, at 99.
"'D.D. 82-17, Cincinnati Bar Association v. Donna C. Schultz, complaint dismissed, June 23, 1982, 55 Ohio
St. B.A. Rep. 1076 (July 5, 1982).
"'Schroeder, supra note 10, at 101.
"'See supra note 10, at 101; Mahoning County Bar Association v. Ruffalo, 176 Ohio St. 263, 199 N.E. 2d
396, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964). (Ruffalo advanced living expenses to clients with F.E.L.A. (railroad)
claims, thereby acquiring an interest in the actions and compounded the offense by hiring a railroad
employee as his agent); Cleveland Bar Association v. Hamilton, 6 Ohio St. 2d 264, 217 N.E. 2d 863 cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 988 (1966), (conflict of interest, commingling).
"'Columbus Bar Association v. Allison, 20 Ohio St. 2d 147, 254 N.E. 2d 366 (1969). Respondent com-
mingled a large sum of money, but made restitution. He claimed he was unaware of the impropriety.
Winter, 1985]
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There is upside risk in contesting a recommendation of indefinite suspen-
sion. During the period of this study, the court has increased the sanction of in-
definite suspension to permanent disbarment in seven cases, 2' reduced it to
public reprimand in three cases,' and to a one year suspension in one'23
(noting that the last sanction has been available only since 1981).
Challenging the one year suspension is not without risk. The court has
reduced the sanction to a public reprimand in one instance,'24 and increased it
to indefinite suspension recently during a period not covered by this study.'
25
Challenging a public reprimand also carries upside risks. One seeks the
almost unattainable dismissal against a record of six cases of increasing public
"in the following reported cases, indefinite suspensions were raised to disbarments: Cincinnati Bar Associa-
tion v. Fennell, 63 Ohio St. 2d 113, 406 N.E. 2d 1129 11980) (multiple counts of misfeasance and
nonfeasance, falsifying a letter from the courts, uncooperative); Ohio State Bar Association v. Talbott, 59
Ohio St. 2d 76, 391 N.E. 2d 1028 11979) (multiple counts of willful neglect of clients, uncooperative, did not
appear before panel to contest); Medina County Bar Association v. Haddad, 57 Ohio St. 2d II, 385 N.E. 2d
294 (1979) (offering a bribe to prosecuting attorney); Stark County Bar Association v. George, 45 Ohio St.
2d 267, 344 N.E. 2d 132 J1976) (fraud in personal bankruptcy filing, left office in charge of layman, abusive
use of process against client); Ohio State Bar Association v. Weaver, 41 Ohio St. 2d 97, 322 N.E. 2d 665
( 19751 (conversion, failure to observe statutory law with respect to administering estate, failed to account for
trust property, though acquitted of criminal misconduct by jury); Lake County Bar Association v.
Ostrander, 41 Ohio St. 2d 93, 322 N.E. 2d 653 (1975) (embezzlement, no restitution, excessive fee): Ohio
State Bar Association v. Kahn, 40 Ohio St. 2d 15, 317 N.E. 2d 913 (1974) (commingling, failure to account,
neglect, multiple instances).
In Cincinnati Bar Association v. Heekin, 9 Ohio St. 3d 84, 459 N.E. 2d 495 (1984), the attorney-president
of River Front Stadium in Cincinnati bypassed two utility meters, obtaining nearly $800,000 of free ser-
vices. (Convicted of two felonies; Indefinite suspension was increased to permanent disbarment). Since this is
a 1984 case, it does not appear in Table I.
'I2 n the following reported cases (all prior to the authorization of one year suspensions), indefinite suspen-
sion reduced to public reprimand: Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Sandier, 51 Ohio St. 2d 132, 364
N.E. 2d 1168 (1977) (received fee in a scheme to defraud owner or insurer; acquitted of criminal charges);
Cleveland Bar Association v. McGinty, 18 Ohio St. 2d 71, 247 N.E. 2d 459 (1969) (several complaints of
neglect, no affirmative dishonesty or malfeasance); Columbus Bar Association v. Grelle, 14 Ohio St. 2d 208,
237 N.E. 2d 298 (1968) (dual representation in divorce, failed to withdraw in a post-divorce matter); Colum-
bus Bar Association v. Nachman, 18 Ohio St. 2d 247, 236 N.E. 2d 289 (1969) (dispute with client over fees,
and whether fund held by attorney was held in trust for client. Matter settled after complaint filed. Attorney
found to be less than forthright).
See Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, 461 N.E. 2d 883 (1984), wherein the panel
recommended a public reprimand, the Board indefinite suspension. The Court ordered a public reprimand.
)Case involved publicity and advertising by a "'Dalkon Shield" expert. First amendment rights were
involved). The case was decided in 1984 and is not included in Table 1.
'
2 Toledo Bar Association v. Kitchen, 69 Ohio St. 2d 338, 432 N.E. 2d 195 (1982). Here, the offense of
unauthorized use of property by attempting to sell it on behalf of a relative (non-client) who did not have title
was reduced from indefinite suspension to a one year suspension.
Cf. Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, supra note 122. Indefinite suspension reduced to a public reprimand
in an advertising case.
'
2
'Columbus Bar Association v. Thompson, 69 Ohio St. 2d 667, 433 N.E. 2d 602 (1982) (Attorney used
client's money to pay office expenses, and issued two NSF checks. Sanction mitigated by fact of no loss to
client and a substitute secretary unfamiliar with accounts was involved).
'
25Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Wilsman, 9 Ohio St. 3d 5, 457 N.E. 2d 824 (1984). (Neglect of a
legal matter, with preparation of a letter falsely indicating the legal matter had been filed). A 1984 case, it
does not appear in Table I.
[Vol. 18:3
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reprimand to indefinite suspension,"' or more likely a one year suspension., 7But there are those who are willing to gamble on a long shot. 2'
On one occasion when the Board recommended indefinite suspension, the
court deferred its final order for a year.2 9 The respondent was a judge who had
on several occasions appeared in judicial proceedings under the influence of al-
cohol. He had been in a period of rehabilitation for about two years at the time
of the hearing. The court stayed an order for a year. When, at the end of a year
following the hearing, he appeared rehabilitated, the court entered an order of
public reprimand. Subsequently, in three cases in which the Board, Disci-
plinary Counsel, or other relator sought a probationary or conditional period
of practice for the offender, the court rejected the effort because it was not
authorized by the current rules. 30 The policy ground was that the state lacks a
probation authority for such offenders (supervision, counseling, and review).
RESIGNATIONS
As Table I indicates, 115 lawyers resigned their franchises during the
seventeen year period of this study. Typically, resignations follow conviction
of a serious crime, or occur during the pendency of an investigation not involv-
ing a crime. Thus, these resignations account for nearly 30% of the
disciplinary actions during the period in question.
The Clark Report noted a risk that stemmed from "Inadequate procedure
for accepting resignations."'' That Report had in mind a ploy whereby the
resignation terminated a pending investigation without marshalling and
"'in the following cases, public reprimands were increased to indefinite suspension: Mahoning County Bar
Association v. Walsh, 8 Ohio St. 3d 32, 456 N.E. 2d 1206 (1983) (prior public reprimand in unrelated
disciplinary sanction; evidence of emotional depression raised question of present fitness); Ohio State Bar
Association v. Stimmel, 61 Ohio St. 2d 316, 401 N.E. 2d 926 (1980) (willful failure to file income tax returns
under Stein rule required indefinite suspension); Ohio State Bar Association v. Consoldane, 50 Ohio St. 2d
337, 364 N.E. 2d 279 (1977) (suggested to client money was needed to influence official action; respondent
previously had been a member of the court family); Columbus Bar Association v. Dixon, 40 Ohio St. 2d 76,
320 N.E. 2d 293 (1974) (willful failure to file income tax return, court felt bound by Stein rule); Cleveland
Bar Association v. Stein, 29 Ohio St. 2d 77, 278 N.E. 2d 670 (1972) (willful failure to file income tax return;
conduct of attorney should be above reproach).
2 Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Carlin, 67 Ohio St. 2d 311,423 N.E. 2d 477 11981) IRespondent
used vulgar language and profanities, disparaged judge, during criminal trial. Public reprimand disapproved.
Given one year suspension).
"'Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. Milano, 9 Ohio St. 3d 86, 459 N.E. 2d 496 (1984). (Public repri-
mand increased to one year suspension. Here, a practitioner of over a quarter of a century was disrespectful
and discourteous to the court on several occasions during a criminal trial. Not included in Table 1.)
29Stark County Bar Association v. Weber, 175 Ohio St. 13, 190 N.E. 2d 918 (1963). The conditional sanc-
tion imposed was later disapproved of in Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Hiller, 5 Ohio St. 3d 237, 450 N.E.
2d 1157 (1983).
"aToledo Bar Association v. Demars, 6 Ohio St. 3d 12, 450 N.E. 2d 1168 (1983) (mishandling cases and
funds, alcohol a problem); Disciplinary Counsel v. Hiller, 5 Ohio St. 3d 237, 450 N.E. 2d 1157 (19831;
Toledo Bar Association v. Kolby, 22 Ohio St. 2d 185, 259 N.E. 2d I I 1 (1970) (wrote toa private investigator
suggestion that he give a witness "a few bucks" to testify respondent's client was not driving under the in-
fluence of alcohol).
'Supra note 2, at 897-901.
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preserving the evidence, and without obtaining an admission of guilt of
misconduct. A subsequent effort at reinstatement by the attorney based upon
a denial of guilt and an allegation that the resignation was made under stress
was difficult to meet when evidence was no longer available.
The Clark solution effected by the ABA Standards was "disbarment by
consent,"'32 i.e., an admission of guilt and consent to the sanction, subject to
approval of the adjudicative body.
President Boer conceived of resignation with prejudice to reinstatement.
Irrevocable resignations, however, did not appear in Rule XXVII of 1957. It
was not effected until February 28, 1972.'11 Therefore, those resigning prior to
that date could (and some did) reapply for reinstatement.'"
Government Rule V(7) (a successor to Rule XXVII) provided:
A person disbarred or a person who has voluntarily surrendered his
license to practice shall never thereafter be readmitted to the practice of
law in this state.
Further, the order accepting the resignation provides that the attorney resign-
ing "[Flully understands that a cancellation and revocation of his license to
practice as an attorney and counselor at law is final."'35
CAUSATIVE FACTORS: ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE
In the Sthroeder report discussed earlier, the most frequent types of
misconduct noted were the violation of conventions concerning advertising
and solicitation followed by the mishandling of clients' money and property. A
generation later, with profound amendment of the advertising rules, the
mishandling of clients' money and property had moved into first place, fol-
lowed by a form of fraud - usually willful failure to file a personal federal in-
come tax return.
What are the causes of these and other seriously deviant behavior by the
practicing lawyer? The current Chairman of the Ohio Board of Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline asserted that the "major cause" is "alcohol or
drugs," followed by "plain old greed.' 36
"'ABA Standard 11.2. Discipline by Consent: "if the respondent admits in writing the truth of the charges
against him. the respondent and the counsel should be able to agree on the nature and extent of the
discipline to be imposed upon the respondent, subject to the approval of the appropriate adjudicative body."
1129 Ohio St. 2d xxix at xxxiii (1972).
"'See Reinstatement of Rasor, 40 Ohio St. 2d 25, 317 N.E. 2d 915 1974). Rasor resigned on March 19,
1965. He petitioned for reinstatement in 1973, and his petition was granted.
'
3
'See. e.g.. a notice of resignation, 49 Ohio St. B.A. Rep. 1546 (Nov. 8, 1976) in which this "boiler plate" ap-
pears.
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Support for the proposition that alcoholism is "a significant causative fac-
tor in disciplinary actions" is found both in studies of lawyer behavior
elsewhere "7 and in mechanisms that have been developed to meet the
problem.'38 Further, there is frequent reference in reported Ohio disciplinary
cases that indicate the presence of alcohol abuse, sometimes coupled with drug
abuse. For example, in thirteen of 163 disciplinary case reports covering the
period of 1967-1983, inclusive, involving misconduct serious enough to merit
permanent disbarment or indefinite suspension - about one case in twelve -
alcohol has been stated to have been a factor.'39 Most of these cases involved
mishandling of funds or neglect of a client's cause, or both. In some other cases
that involve a pattern of neglect, failure to respond to clients' inquiries,
mishandling of funds, uttering bad checks and failure to report income, one
suspects a problem of alcoholism even though an alcohol problem is not ex-
pressed in the case report. Anecdotal evidence supports this view.
The Ohio Supreme Court, consistent with opinion elsewhere, 4' does not
accept alcohol or drug abuse as an excuse for the misconduct.'' This reflects
the view that discipline is prophylaxis, not punishment, though alcoholism
may be considered as mitigation in determining the sanction. For the most
part, the court in practice has shown little compassion for those who abuse
alcohol or drugs and who appear before them as respondents.'"2
"'WOLF, Alcoholism and the Legal Profession, 62 MICH. B.J. 873 (1983).
'See Wolf, The Lawyers and Judges Assistance Program, An Evaluation Study - 1979-1981, 62 MICH.
B.J. 874 (1983); Bates, The Alcoholic Attorney: What to Do? Id., 879.
"'Disbarment, mishandling client's funds or property: Lake County Bar Association v. Ostrander, 41 Ohio
St. 2d 93, 322 N.E. 24653 (1975); Cincinnati Bar Association v. Lacinak, 46 Ohio St. 2d 393, 348 N.E. 2d
723 (1976); Bar Association of Greater Cleveland v. McGarry, 60 Ohio St. 2d 168, 398 N.E. 2d 560 (1979).
Indefinite suspension, willful failure to file income tax return, Dayton Bar Association v. Kern, 46 Ohio St.
2d 342, 348 N.E. 2d 707 (1976); indefinite suspension, trafficking in drugs, Cincinnati Bar Association v.
Levin, 3 Ohio St. 3d 25, 445 N.E. 2d 661 (1983); indefinite suspension, uttering numerous bad checks, Co-
lumbus Bar Association v. Gross, 2 Ohio St. 3d 5,441 N.E. 2d 570 11982). Indefinite suspension, mishandl-
ing funds and/or neglect of client's interest: Ohio State Bar Association v. Roest, 54 Ohio St. 2d 95, 374 N.E.
2d 1366 (1978); Dayton Bar Association v. Delcontivo, 66 Ohio St. 2d 109, 420 N.E. 2d 113 (1981): Dayton
Bar Association v. Stinchfield, 65 Ohio St. 2d 130, 418 N.E. 2d 1366 (1981); Mahoning County Bar Associa-
tion v. Kelly, 4 Ohio St. 3d 188, 447 N.E. 2d 1304 (1983): Disciplinary Counsel v. Hiller, 5 Ohio St. 3d 237,
450 N.E. 2d 1157 (1983); Toledo Bar Association v. Demars, 6 Ohio St. 3d 12, 450 N.E. 2d 1168 (1983).
Reinstatement granted, In re Reinstatement of Coogan, 35 Ohio St. 2d 114, 298 N.E. 2d 518 (1973). Coogan
had been indefinitely suspended for neglect of a client's cause and receiving an excess fee, Cincinnati Bar
Association v. Coogan, 21 Ohio St. 2d 147, 256 N.E. 2d 218, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 866 (1970).
""In re Driscoll, 85 Ill. 2d 312, 316,423 N.E. 2d 873, 874 (1981): "[Allcoholism is at most an extenuating cir-
cumstance, a mitigating factor, not an excuse."
"Disciplinary Counsel v. Hiller, 5 Ohio St. 3d 237, 450 N.E. 2d 1157 (1983); Toledo Bar Association v.
Demars, 6 Ohio St. 3d 12, 450 N.E. 2d 1168 (1983). Cincinnati Bar Association v. Fettner, 8 Ohio St. 3d 17,
455 N.E. 2d 1288 (1983) (mental illness does not excuse, but only mitigates the offense. A Jbrtiori. alcohol
abuse).
" 
2See Lake County Bar Association v. Ostrander, 41 Ohio St. 2d 93, 322 N.E. 2d 653 (1975), disbarment for
mishandling funds, though drinking problem noted, and cases cited, supra, n. 139: cf. Stark County Bar
Association v. Weber, 175 Ohio St. 13, 190 N.E. 2d 918 (1963), under different rules, wherein court delayed
an order against a trial judge for approximately one year and entered a public reprimand, not indefinite
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Although faced with recommendations from both the Board and
Disciplinary Counsel for a continuation of probation of those identified as
alcoholic and who have undertaken a program of rehabilitation, the court on
two recent occasions has refused to approve "conditional licensure.' '"4 3 Refusal
was based on the absence in the court rules for probation, and the realization
that, to have probation, a system of supervision must be created - probation
requires probation officers and counseling, and these mechanisms are not
generally available through the bar.
If alcoholism is accepted as a form of illness, and if some alternative to the
present disciplinary mechanism is not created, the consequence is likely to be
the continued abuse of clients, courts, and colleagues until a sufficient number
of instances of misconduct are experienced to indefinitely suspend or disbar the
lawyer. Stark County Bar Association v. Lukens, I" involving not alcohol but
disabilitating diabetes and prophyria suggests a like outcome in cases involving
alcohol as an illness. On the other hand, if procedures to divert an identified
alcoholic practitioner from the current disciplinary system were developed,
there exists a potential remedy to spare the public from harm, and to save the
career of the lawyer. A system of peer review' 5 and psychological counseling'
hold that promise. Both state and local bar associations should be encouraged
to develop these, and the court rule changed to provide for probation.
REINSTATEMENT: FACTORS
The courts are in general agreement on both the purpose of reinstatement
and the factors relevant to those ends. The purpose of discipline is prophylac-
tic. It is not to punish, though it may have that effect, but to protect the public,
the courts, and the profession - the administration of justice - from the er-
rant attorney by removing him either temporarily or permanently from the
practice of law, or threatening to do so if his misconduct is repeated.' 7 Sanc-
tions serve as a deterrent to similar misconduct by others.
And so it is with reinstatement;' 8 its goal is not to relieve from, or to con-
tinue, punishment, but to determine whether reinstatement of the attorney to
'Disciplinary Counsel v. Hiller, 5 Ohio St. 3d 237, 450 N.E. 2d 1157 (1983); Toledo Bar Association v.
Demars, 6 Ohio St. 3d 12, 450 N.E. 2d 1168 (1983).
1"48 Ohio St. 2d 187, 357 N.E. 2d 1083 (1976).
"'Smith, Peer Review: Its Time Has Come, 66 A.B.A.J. 451 (1980); ALI-ABA, A Model Peer Review
System (Discussion Draft, 1980).
"See supra note 138.
WMatter of Gordon, 429 N.E. 2d 1150 (S. Ct. Mass., 1982). ABA Standard 1.1:
The purpose of lawyer discipline and disability proceedings is to maintain appropriate standards of
professional conduct in order to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who
have demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or are likely to be unable to discharge their
professional duties.
" Matter of Gordon, supra note 147.
[Vol. 18:3
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practice is in the public interest.' 9 The issue is whether the attorney is a fit per-
son to resume the practice of law, that he is not likely to repeat his misconduct,
that in his reformation, he has become a law abiding citizen, that he will show
proper regard for the duties and responsibilities of his profession, and that his
readmission is not detrimental to the public interest, while at the same time,
dealing fairly with the attorney.50 These findings depend in the largest
measure on a change in attitude on the part of the applicant and reinstatement
will stand or fall on his ability to persuade the court "by clear and convincing
evidence"'' that he has the proper, professional attitude.
Courts recognize that there are no guarantees that the petitioner, if read-
mitted, will never again engage in misconduct. If guarantees were required,
none would qualify.' The courts can only reduce the risk to an acceptable
level by requiring an affirmative showing by clear and convincing evidence
that the petitioner has experienced rehabilitation, that he has returned to a
beneficial and constructive role in society, and that he is likely to act in a pro-
fessional manner.
The court rules or case law require that one possess "all of the qualifica-
tions, mental, educational and moral, which would have been a requirement of
an applicant for admission to the Bar at the time of his original admission."'53
Courts arrive at a judgment for or against the petitioner by considering
eight principal factors:'54 (1) the nature of the prior misconduct; (2) the maturi-
ty and experience of the petitioner at the time of the discipline; (3) whether the
petitioner recognizes the nature and seriousness of the misconduct; (4) whether
the petitioner has made restitution or made good the loss resulting from his
misconduct; (5) the nature of his conduct since he was disciplined; (6) time
elapsed since his disbarment or suspension; (7) his forthrightness (sincerity,
frankness, and truthfulness) in presenting and discussing these factors relating
to his suspension and reinstatement; and (8) his current proficiency in the law.
In addition, the following evidentiary factors may be considered: (1)
Whether his bar association (frequently the relator) recommends'55 or op-
'
91n re Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 50 N.E. 2d 785 (1943); In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E. 2d 429 (1975); In
re Thatcher, 83 Ohio St. 246, 93 N.E. 895 (1910).
'"Petition of Edelman, 77 Wash. 2d 42, 43, 459 P. 2d 387, 388 (1969). "First our concern in these matters
[reinstatement] is for the interest of the public and justice to the legal profession, as well as fairness to the ap-
plicant."
"Gov. R. V, Sec. 26:
No person shall be reinstated unless he has established by clear and convincing evidence that he
possesses all of the qualifications, mental, educational and moral which would have been a require-
ment of an applicant for admission to the Bar of Ohio at the time of his original admission....
"'Matter of McKeon, 656 P. 2d 179 (Mont., 1982).
"'Gov. R. V, Sec. 26, supra note 151.
"See Matter of Batali, 98 Wash. 2d 610, 657 P. 2d 775 (1983).
'"in re Reinstatement of Kearns, 28 Ohio St. 2d 121, 276 N.E. 2d 650 f1971).
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poses5 6 reinstatement; (2) whether the offender was a public official;, 7 (3)
whether he has a record of prior offenses and sanctions;' (4) whether the peti-
tioner has been pardoned of the offense;5 9 (5) whether the prior misconduct is
now an offense (change of law); t6° (6) mental and physical condition at the time
of the application; 6' and (7) testimony and testimonials of prominent citizens,
public officials, and lawyers.
A discussion of the foregoing is in order. Ohio has resolved the problem of
unforgivable misconduct by the sanction of permanent disbarment. Thus, the
court determines at the time of the original discipline whether or not the op-
portunity for reinstatement is to be held out. Some jurisdictions that do not
recognize permanent disbarment reach the same result by stating that some of-
fenses are of such heinous moral turpitude that the court will refuse even to ap-
point a referee to take testimony on a petition for reinstatement.'63 Dishonest
conduct by public officials, for example, may place them beyond the pale.'"
Ohio reaches this result by the Fatica65 Rule that permanently disbars both
bribe taking public officials and bribe offering attorneys.'t
The view that best expresses the prophylactic, as opposed to the punitive
view, of disbarment or suspension is that of the Massachusetts court in In the
Reinstatement of Hiss: 167
No offense is so grave that a disbarred attorney who seeks reinstatement
is automatically precluded from attempting to demonstrate through am-
ple and adequate proof ... that he has achieved a "present fitness" to
serve as an attorney and has led a sufficiently exemplary life to inspire
public confidence once again, in spite of his previous actions.
" in re Reinstatement of Hughes, 66 Ohio St. 2d 135, 420 N.E. 2d 1000 (1981).
" Petition of Centracchio, 345 Mass. 342, 187 N.E. 2d 383 (1950) (previously venal judge who was disbarred
was not to be reinstated despite showing of present good moral character); Matter of Gordon, supra note
147, (higher standards for reinstatement when the disbarment was prompted by misconduct while a judge
venality).
'"Cleveland Bar Association v. Pleasant, 171 Ohio St. 546, 172 N.E. 2d 911 (1961). Pleasant had been
previously suspended and reinstated. This was an attempt for a second reinstatement; (denied).
'5'Matter of Beck, 264 Ind. 141, 342 N.E. 2d 611 (1976).
'"In re Braverman, 271 Md. 196, 316 A. 2d 246 (1974) (convicted of Smith Act violation 10 years previously
and disbarred. Smith Act prosecutions are now outmoded. Reinstated in state courts, but readmission to
federal District Court of Maryland denied, Matter of Braverman, 399 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1975)).
"'Gov. R. V, Sec. 26, supra note 151.
"oJonesi v. State Bar, 29 Cal. 2d 181, 173 P. 2d 793 (1946); Reinstatement of Rasor, 40 Ohio St. 2d 25, 317
N.E. 2d 915 (1974).
"'Application of Van Wyck, 225 Minn. 90, 29 N.W. 2d 654 (1947).
'Petition of Centracchio, supra note 157; Petition of Gordon, supra note 157; but see Reinstatement of
Kearns, supra note 155 (County prosecutor convicted and disbarred for embezzling $210 from a public fund;
reinstated 16 years later).
"'Cleveland Bar Association v. Fatica, 28 Ohio St. 2d 40, 274 N.E. 2d 763 (1971) (Convicted as City Coun-
cilman of soliciting and accepting money to influence his official duties; permanently disbarred.)
10Medina County Bar Association v. Haddad, 57 Ohio St. 2d II, 385 N.E. 2d 294 (1979) (Offense was offer-
ing bribe to a prosecuting attorney. Fatica rule controlled sanction of permanent disbarment.)
7n re Hiss. supra note 149.
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Under this doctrine, Alger Hiss was reinstated after a twenty-three year
absence from the bar following a conviction of perjury.
But the more serious the offense, the greater the onus on the petitioner to
prove his rehabilitation, and the longer the likely period of suspension from the
bar. 168
The maturity and experience of the petitioner at the time of the original
discipline is a factor considered in the matter of reinstatement.'69 Experience
demonstrates that rarely is the young, professionally immature attorney the
perpetrator of misconduct resulting in serious discipline. Recalling a statement
of Commissioner Coen of the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievance and
Discipline, he makes the point that: "It is not against the young and uninitiated
practitioner that complaints have been filed. The average age of lawyers in-
volved in disciplinary hearings [in Ohio] is fifty, each having practiced an
average of twenty-six years."'70
Recognition of the nature and seriousness of one's misconduct followed
by remorse, regret and apology - in short, contrition - evidences a proper at-
titude for rehabilitation and professional rebirth.'' Yet, in the Alger Hiss
case,' Hiss steadfastly maintained his innocence and contrition would have
been out of character and an act of hypocrisy on his part; so in Braverman'
who, convicted under the Smith Act, adamantly maintained his innocence. To
demand contrition as an inexorable test for reinstatement is improper, as the
Hiss and Braverman courts pointed out.
Restitution, partial restitution, or an attempt to make restitution is critical
to reinstatement by those with the means to pay;"' so with repairing damages
to a client.'75 The just person does not reap where he has not sown, and gives to
each man his due. Failure to act justly bears on professional attitude. On the
'"See, e.g., In re Hiss, supra note 149 (convicted of perjury, disbarred, reinstated after 23 years); In re Braver-
man, supra note 160 (convicted of Smith Act violation, disbarred, reinstated in state courts after 19 years);
In re Kearns, supra note 155 (county prosecutor convicted of embezzelment, resigned franchise, reinstated
after 16 years; Cincinnati Bar Association v. Chacksfield, 50 Ohio St. 2d 305, 364 N.E. 2d 260 (1977), in-
definitely suspended for aggravating menace against bailiff outside courtroom, reinstated after 3 years; Ohio
State Bar Association v. Stimmel, 61 Ohio St. 2d 316, 401 N.E. 2d 926 (1980), indefinitely suspended for
willful failure to file federal tax returns, reinstated after 2 years.
1'In re Burke, 21 O.C.C. 34, 11 O.C.D. 397 (Cuyahoga Cir. Ct. 1900).
"'Coen, A Lawyer Looks at Discipline in Ohio, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 245, 250 (1977).
"'Petition of Rubin, 323 So. 2d 257 (Fla., 1975).
"'See supra note 149.
"'See supra note 160.
"'In re Stumpt, 272 Ky. 593, 114 S.W. 2d 1094 (1938); In re Clark, 464 A. 2d 879 (Del. 1983); In re
Reinstatement of Hughes, 66 Ohio St. 2d 135, 420 N.E. 2d 1000(1981) (failure to reimburse client's security
fund was a strong factor against reinstatement, where fund had covered the defalcation).
"'Reinstatement of Miller, 35 Ohio St. 2d 135, 298 N.E. 2d 583 (1973). Settlement of judgments against him
by former clients was a favorable factor in his reinstatement. Disbarred attorney's failure to pay balance due
on judgment against him justified denial of his petition for reinstatement, Kepler v. State Bar of California,
216 Cal. 52, 13 P. 2d 509 (1932).
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other hand, those who cannot make restitution are not expected to do so.'76
In the Matter of Batali,'" where a suspended attorney filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy and had discharged (rightly or wrongly) debts owed
those subrogated to the client's position for money owed them and federal in-
come tax obligations, the issue was raised whether the Washington Supreme
Court could condition the attorney's reinstatement on the post-bankruptcy
reaffirmation of these discharged debts. The court properly held such condi-
tion violated both the federal Constitution (Supremacy Clause) and the
Bankruptcy Act. However, the case does not foreclose consideration of one's
failure to reaffirm just obligations as evidence of an unrepentant attitude.
One's conduct since he was disciplined is cogent evidence of reformation
and proper attitude.' There are no mechanical steps to be taken by which one
can gain readmission. But the following are favorable indicators: that he has
earned an honest living, that he has been engaged in a position of trust and
gained the respect of others, that he has led an upright life, and that he has
been charitable. 79
Fatal to reinstatement is the violation of the order of one's disbarment
(under the ABA definition) or suspension; e.g., failing to inform clients, adver-
saries and courts before whom cases are pending of his disability,'8° continuing
to practice law, or holding one's self out as practicing law by failing to remove,
where possible, his name from legal directories and listings, or failing to
remove or cover up a shingle or office sign.
One may be employed as a law clerk (at least in Florida), but if he is
employed by his former partner as a clerk, he should withdraw if an objection
is raised.'8 ' Employment as a law clerk is desirable since it preserves one's skills.
Yet, the line between what a lawyer and a layman may do is not bright, and he
may easily be accused of stepping over it. Employment in a quais-legal position
in business' or government' is a desirable choice.
Proceedings in reinstatement are inquisitorial rather than adversarial in
"'In re Hawkins, 27 Del. 200, 87 A. 243 (1913). Restitution is given little weight since it may depend more
on financial ability than repentance.
'"See supra note 154.
"id at 777-78.
"'Disbarred attorney seeking admission should avoid questionable financial dealings with clients and
business associates and engaging in conduct precariously approaching unauthorized practice. Reinstatement
denied. Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia v. Pence, 297 S.E. 2d 843 (W.Va. 1982).
" Steps that a disqualified or resigned attorney must take in Ohio appear in Gov. R. V, sec. (20) (b) (i), and
generally in the ABA Standard 6.11.
"'Florida Bar v. Thomson, 310 So. 2d 300 (S. Ct. Fla, 1975), noted 4 Fla. St. L.J. 296 (1976); contra In re
Kuta, 86 111. 2d 154, 56 111. Dec. 56, 310 N.E. 2d 136 (1981).
'&,ee In re Rasor, 40 Ohio St. 2d 25, 317 N.E. 2d 915 (1974) (personnel manager engaged in labor relations
in a manufacturing firm).
1'See In re Reinstatement oj Kearns, supra note 155, claims examiner in Industrial Commission of Ohio.
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nature. The petitioner is therefore expected to be candid and forthright in his
presentation. Concealment of material fact, such as two arrests which oc-
curred since his suspension, even though they were dropped, was fatal in In re
Gehring,' 4 afortiori affirmatively false statements in the petition.'85
The length of time elapsed between disbarment or suspension and the ap-
plication for reinstatement is a factor commonly appearing in the law of
reinstatement.'86 The time elapsed may be too short to establish a reasonable
basis or juding good character. 8 On the other hand, it should not be needlessly
lengthened to punish the offender. Court rules usually provide for a minimum
period of suspension before one can be reinstated, e.g., five years for those
jurisdictions following the definition of disbarment in the ABA Standards, 8 or
two years for those indefinitely suspended in Ohio. 9 Apart from these
minima, no mechanical answer can be given to the question of how long an at-
torney must wait. As noted earlier, certainly the more grievous the offense, the
more likely a longer period of rehabilitation.' 90 With time, public memory dims,
and the less reluctant is the tribunal to reinstate those whose offenses, like
Hiss's, gained notoriety.
In addition to the establishment of good moral character, the petitioner
must be competent as a lawyer, i.e., have sufficient legal learning to carry out
the duties of his office.' 9' A long period of absence from the law and the rapidly
changing corpus juris may cast doubt on the petitioner's competency, absent
persuasive evidence that he has kept abreast of the law.' 91
The acid test of competency is passing the state's current bar examination.
Whether passing a current bar examination should be a condition of admission
is left to the sound discretion of the courts in most jurisdictions.
In Ohio, "ITihe order of reinstatement may be conditioned upon the peti-
tioner's subsequently taking and passing a regular bar examination of this
Court.. ."93 In re Petition for Reinstatement of Atkins, '1 the petitioner had
1"22 Cal. 2d 708, 140 P. 2d 413 (1943).
"'In re Kepler, 79 Cal. App. 611, 250 P. 701 (1926).
"in re Rothenberg, 31 Ohio Law Abs. 370 (Montgomery Co. Ct. App., 1940); Matter of Gordon, supra note
147.
"'in re Palmer, 8 O.C.D. 508, 15 O.C.C. 94 (Fayette Co. Cir. Ct., 1897).
'"ABA Standard 6.2: "The lawyer should not be able to apply for readmission until at least five years after
the effective date of his disbarment ......
"'Gov. R. V, Sec. (23):
No petition for reinstatement to the practice of law shall be entertained by this Court and the same
may not be filed in this Court, within a period of two (2) years after the entry of an order suspending
for an indefinite period the Petitioner from the practice of law in this State or within a period of two
(2) years after the denial of a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law filed by such Petitioner.
'"See cases cited supra note 168.
"'Gov. R. V, Sec. 26, supra note 151.
"'See In re Hiss. supra note 149; though away from practice for twenty-three years, he had kept current in
the field of his specialty, international law.
"'Gov. R. V, Sec. 26, supra note 151.
'2 Ohio St. 3d 32, 442 N.E. 2d 754 (1982).
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been admitted to the bar in 1959, engaged in limited practice, and was suspend-
ed in 1979 for neglect of clients' affairs and failing to seek their lawful objec-
tives. He applied for reinstatement and a hearing was held in 1982. On oral ex-
amination by a representative of the local bar, Atkins was shown to be
unaware of Ohio's then recently codified Rules of Evidence, and changes in
Ohio tort law. The court rejected his petition and conditioned his reinstate-
ment at a later date upon his passing the Ohio bar examination or alternately,
undergoing a program of bar sponsored continuing legal education. On the
other hand, one Fleck was readmitted without such condition, though he had
been suspended for eleven years, based upon his uncontradicted testimony that
he had kept abreast of the law by reading various current legal publications.'95
In In re Petition for Reinstatement of Rasor, " the petitioner volunteered
to take the Ohio bar examination and he was reinstated with that condition.
Fleck and Atkins can be reconciled only by the fact that Fleck's legal
learning was unchallenged, whereas Atkins was examined by the relator's at-
torney who demonstrated by oral examination that Atkins was not current on
the law. Reinstatement ought not turn on the fortuity of whether one is orally
tested or not. The passing of a bar examination for those who are not readmit-
ted within a four-year period following suspension should be routinely re-
quired, save in the most exceptional cases.'97
As previously observed, present competency includes all the qualifications
"mental, educational and moral" which appertained at the time of the peti-
tioner's original admission. But what of meeting residency requirements where
they exist? The intent to practice law? Rasor provided a response to the latter
question. As a matter of law, one need not intend to practice as a "Main
Street" lawyer in Ohio to be reinstated. His interest may be to continue as an
administrator or inside counsel, and may be, as in Rasor, to benefit his
employer. Indeed, one may simply want to be restored to a status once held,
for its own sake. But in a highly discretionary proceeding, one so motivated is
likely to generate little empathy with a Board of busy, dedicated practitioners.
One would expect a like response to the lawyer who does not wish to prac-
tice in the state of disbarment but in a second state. And so the Iowa Supreme
Court has properly held that where one intends to practice is irrelevant' 98 to
reinstatement.
Residency in a state may be a requirement either for admission to the bar,
"'In re Reinstatement of Fleck, 49 Ohio St. 2d 82, 278 N.E. 2d 669 (1972).
'Supra note 182.
"'See. e.g.. Reinstatement of Coogan, 35 Ohio St. 2d 114, 298 N.E. 2d 518 (1973). Petitioner was out of prac-
tice for forty-seven months and taught business law at a major university. The author would advocate waiv-
ing the taking of a bar examination in such case.
'"State v. Maxey, 186 N.W. 40 Iowa, 1922).
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or a condition of practicing law in the state. What of the practitioner who met
the requirement initially, but was disbarred or suspended, and at the time of his
petition for readmission is a non-resident? Where a residency requirement ex-
ists, the courts have not been uniform in their response. A New Mexico court
denied the application of a petitioning non-resident in view of a state residency
requirement which had existed since the time of his initial admission to the bar
of that state. 9' In Indiana, a disbarred attorney seeking reinstatement need not
establish the fact of residency as a condition of reinstatement or that he in-
tends to practice in that state.?° To date, the Ohio Supreme Court has not had
occasion to rule on this issue.
In addition to meeting the "mental" requirement of Rule V, Sec. 26, the
petitioner should be free of the psychiatric and psychological problems that
caused or contributed to his misconduct. Those who are alcoholic should be
certified as recovered and able to cope with that illness (the alcoholic is said
never to be cured). The addict should have successfully undertaken a
rehabilitation program, and those whose stability depends on regular dosages
of prescribed drugs to maintain their stability (e.g., lithium treatment) should
be under supervised treatment. The Ohio Supreme Court, unfortunately, ex-
pects a "cure," not practice under supervised probation while a cure is being
undertaken. 0' The rationale of rejecting probation for the alcoholic and the
drug addicted is that probation, "conditional licensure," is not authorized by
the Court Rule. 02 A policy argument, as noted earlier, is that the bar associa-
tions have not, for the most part, established supervisory groups for those who
are alcoholic or addicted to drugs.
Concerning subsidiary factors, bar support, or at least lack of
opposition,0 3 does not assure success. On the other hand, objections of the bar
who served as relator or in whose territorial jurisdiction he resides, is quite like-
ly to defeat his application, at least in Ohio.?°
The existence of a prior sanction tends to defeat a petition for reinstate-
'"In re Fleming, 36 N.M. 93, 8 P. 2d 1063 (1932).
"Matter of Beck, supra note 159, by court rule.
2 See cases cited supra note 143.
ZU21d.
...State v. Russo, 230 Kan. 5, 630 P. 2d 711 (198 1); Cleveland Bar Association v. Pleasant, 171 Ohio St. 546,
172 N.E. 2d 911 11961) (where no objection was interposed by the local bar associationl.
See In re Morton, 75 Cal. App. 497, at 498, 243 P. 32, at 33 (1925), where the court said:
The Bar Association presents no opposition to the reinstatement. On the contrary, the justices are
directly informed by the president of the association that its trustees have considered the matter and
have determined that no objection should be made. We take this as a definite decision that no objec-
tion ought to be made. The petition was allowed. (Emphasis in original).
'ln re Petition for Atkins, 2 Ohio St. 3d 32, 442 N.E. 2d 754 (1982); In re Reinstatement of Hughes, supra
note 156 (those local bar associations opposed); In re Edwards, 172 Ohio St. 351, 176 N.E. 2d 409 (1961).
The opposition of the Akron Bar Association appears in the record of the case, Brief in Opposition to the
Recommendation of the Board of Commissioners.
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ment. In Cleveland Bar v. Pleasant," 5 the applicant for reinstatement was
suspended for eight months in 1941, and reinstated. In 1958, he was indefinite-
ly suspended for fraud in the probate of an estate. In 1960, he petitioned for
reinstatement. The Cleveland Bar Association did not oppose. The hearing
panel agreed that he had been rehabilitated. The court rejected a recommenda-
tion that he be reinstated, saying he was "'Weighed in the balance and found
wanting' . . . Not once but twice of record."
The courts uniformly hold that a full and unconditional pardon of the of-
fense that led to a disbarment does not nullify the disbarment proceedings.2°6
Most courts hold that a pardon does not compel a court to reinstate an attor-
ney.207 A pardon may open a door that is otherwise barred, as for example, in
those states that have a law that a convicted felon may not hold the office of
attorney (a "felony-disbarment" rule). Ohio has no such rule. The existence of
a pardon may open the door in another sense, that of mitigating or avoiding
adverse public reaction to the reinstatement of a lawyer whose crime gained
notoriety.
The fact that a lawyer, convicted of conduct that was an offense at the
time, would not be convicted of the same conduct under today's rules, does not
itself justify reinstatement. Thus, one who has been disbarred in a federal court
because of a conviction of the Smith Act found unavailing an argument that
today Smith Act prosecutions, which cost him his license, are outmoded, and
his application for reinstatement was denied.208 The lawyer is expected to abide
by rules lawful at the time. One would expect the same consideration to apply
to those disbarred or suspended for publicity, unprofessional at the time, but
now permitted, as in the case of limited advertising.
One cannot question the logic of a view that a change of law does not
remove the former offense. But since the nature of a prior offense is a factor in
the highly judgmental matter of reinstatement, the current legality (or at least
acceptance) of the conduct should lessen the weight of that factor.
Testimonials by prominent citizens, public officials, and lawyers get mixed
reception from the courts. They are relevant to proof of good report and good
character. But they carry little weight if they appear motivated by sympathy,
or by statement that the applicant "has been punished enough" or where the
writer is ignorant of the grounds of disbarment; so it is also with references
from persons distant from the city in which the applicant is employed."0 On
the other hand, favorable letters of recommendation and the personal
, 0Seesupra note 158.
2 Matter of Beck, supra note 200 Wettlin v. State Bar of California, 24 Cal. 2d 862, 151 P. 2d 255 (1944).
'1'd.. contra, Ex Parte Crisler, 159 Miss. 247, 132 So. 103 (1931).
" Matter of Braverman, 399 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1975). Braverman was reinstated in the state courts, supra
note 160.
""Beeks v. State Bar of California, 35 Cal. 2d 268, 217 P. 2d 409 (1950).
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testimony of witnesses are entitled to great weight if they address the relevant
issues of integrity, trustworthiness, law abidance, and sobriety by persons who
have had frequent and intimate contacts with the petitioner."' Such evidence
alone is not conclusive, however."'
REINSTATEMENT: INCIDENCE IN OHIO
Judicial attitudes toward reinstatement vary from virtual inexorability of
the prior sanction on the one hand to extreme compassion on the other. Drink-
er found support in case law, for the proposition that reinstatement after dis-
barment should almost never occur, and should be granted only in exceptional
cases and advocated it."' On the other hand, views expressed by Justice Field213
in 1871 down to a recent Massachusetts judge in a disciplinary hearing who re-
fused to continue the suspension of lawyer O'Brian because it "would result in
extreme hardship to Mr. O'Brian's family"2 4 were those of undue compassion.
The problem facing Ohio in the decade of the 1950's was the decentraliza-
tion of the reinstatement process in the hands of the trial courts in eighty-eight
counties, and the existence of a problem later identified by the Clark Report as
nationwide, "Disbarred attorneys [are] too readily reinstated by the Courts."21
Rule XXVII, effective in 1957, required all petitions for reinstatement to
be addressed to the supreme court for hearing by the Board of Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline and review by the courts and that the applicant
possess all the qualifications, mental, educational, and moral which would
have been a requirement of an applicant of the bar at the time of his original
admission, to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The petitioner
began the proceedings with the entire record of his prior sanction as evidence
against him.21
In the first ten years of operation under this Rule, there were four applica-
tions for reinstatement, two of which were denied by the Board and confirmed
by the court.1 7 Two petitions were recommended to be granted by the Board
who found the petitioners rehabilitated."' The court rejected the recommenda-
tions and denied the petitions. In one, the attorney had been suspended by a
local court for eight months, reinstated, found guilty of a fraud on the court,
21 0
onesi v. State Bar, 29 Cal. 2d 181, 173 P. 2d 793 (1946).
"'Roth v. State Bar, 40 Cal. 2d 307, 253 P. 2d 969 (1953).
212H. DRINKER. LEGAL ETHICS, 49 (1953). Support for Drinker's statement, both before and after its publica-
tion include: Petition of Emmons, 330 Mich. 303, 47 N.E. 2d 620 (1951); In the Application of Koker, 214
Or. 357, 329 P. 2d 894 (1958).
2180 U.S. (Wall) 335, at 355: "To deprive one of the office of this character [attorney at lawI would often be
to decree poverty to himself and destitution to his family."
2
'Matter of O'Brien, 2 Mass. Disc. Rep. 166, 168 (1981).
"Clark Report, supra note 2, at 946.
26Disbarment of Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. 35, 125 N.E. 2d 328 (1955).
2
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and sanctioned a second time with indefinite suspension. There was little to
support the applicant other than the passage of time, no post-suspension
misconduct, and no opposition from the bar. There was no affirmative
evidence to show that the applicant would not repeat his misconduct. 9
The second case22 was one to evoke great sympathy, and apparently did
so with the Board. But the Akron Bar Association, through a blue ribbon com-
mittee, opposed the recommendation successfully by showing delay in making
restitution for converting a settlement to a disabled workman, and alleged lack
of candor in petitioner's discussing the use of the proceeds.
The attitude of the then Ohio Supreme Court was as suggested by
Drinker. A petitioner in reinstatement, if it were to occur at all, would have to
meet the most exacting standards.
Table I indicates that forty-five petitioners for reinstatement have been
filed, of which only four have been denied. At first blush, a 93% success rate
strikes one as unduly high. But these data must be viewed in context.
First, from the 41 successful applications must be deducted 4 one year
suspensions, which, while not automatic, do not involve a question of
rehabilitation. Secondly, the Ohio Supreme Court has diverted from the
stream of reinstatements 36 permanent disbarments and 115 resignations with
prejudice to reinstatement. It is within these 151 cases that the most difficult
decisions for instatements would fall and denials would likely occur. Thirdly,
the inauguration of the one year suspension in 1981 has spawned the Wolfe
rule, vice Stein, in the matter of sanctions for the willful failure to report one's
income for federal tax purposes. Whereas Stein mandated an indefinite suspen-
sion for the offense, notwithstanding extenuating circumstances, Wolfe, with a
one year suspension, has become the norm where mitigating circumstances are
present. About half the successful petitions have been granted to those in-
definitely suspended for the aforesaid tax offense, after the decision in Wolfe.
A difficulty in evaluating the current judicial attitude is the absence of re-
ported cases dealing with successful reinstatement, and indeed, not all the deni-
als are reported. Three of four denials are reported, however, and only 5 of 41
successful applications merited a report. The remainder appear as docket en-
tries.
The three denials were justified in terms of affirmative evidence of the
2t Cleveland Bar Association v. Pleasant, 171 Ohio St. 2d 546, 172 N.E. 2d 911 (1961).
uln re Edwards, 172 Ohio St. 351, 176 N.E. 2d 409 (1961. The record appearing in the case indicated that
Edwards was suspended in 1933 for converting a $2,000 settlement of a claim and using the proceeds for his
own purposes. He turned to barbering, raised a family of three children, and thereafter had a clear record.
He served as sometime Treasurer to four organizations. At age 72, he made a second attempt at reinstate-
ment, indicating a willingness to retake the Ohio bar. The Akron Bar Association opposed the reinstatement
on the basis that he had strung out the reimbursement of the client over a fourteen year period and had not
been candid with regard to the use of the money.
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lack of rehabilitation: belated performance of obligation post-suspension in one
(but reinstated on the second try);22' failure to make restitution and vigorous
bar opposition in a second;" and lack of sufficient legal learning in the third.2
Of the five successful applications reported: alcohol was a problem in one
and it affirmatively appeared that its victim was rehabilitated;22 personal
tragedy and psychiatric problems were causes in a second and it affirmatively
appeared that these had been overcome;225 a third involved solicitation, hardly
a matter involving crimen falsi, where the applicant had good references and
no opposition from the bar;226 a fourth involved a conflict of interest with
clients in a business transaction, adverse judgments, a good work record for
two years, settlements to the satisfaction of the clients, and no opposition from
the local bar;27 a fifth involved an embezzlement of a small sum of public
money by a prosecutor who reapplied after sixteen years, with affirmative sup-
port of the bar, with a good work record in a state agency.2
"Reformation and regeneration should be open to any man," a California
court declared, "and when effected should merit a just reward." '229 Most would
agree. The problem, however, lies in the ease or difficulty of the proof of refor-
mation. If a case for reinstatement is made out merely by the passage of time
during which a person has made a living in an acceptable occupation, without
any business improprieties following discipline, the absence of opposition from
the local bar, without an affirmative showing of reformation and regeneration,
then suspended attorneys are too readily readmitted by the court and the pur-
pose of discipline and reinstatement has been defeated.
The Ohio cases of reinstatement granted discussed above, to the extent
that they are a fair sample, the frequency with which reinstatement is granted
in recent times, and the treatment of tax offenders under the Wolfe doctrine
demonstrate a compassionate application of the factors of reinstatement, in
some case, too compassionate, by the supreme court.
CONCLUSIONS
Professor Schroeder, it may be recalled, concluded his ten year study with
an observation that, "Discipline was simple and most effective, reinstatement
"'Ohio State Bar Association v. Hart, 15 Ohio St. 2d 97, 238 N.E. 2d 560 (1968).
"'Reinstatement of Hughes, 66 Ohio St. 2d 135, 420 N.E. 2d 1000 (1981).
"
3Reinstatement of Atkins, 2 Ohio St. 3d 32, 442 N.E. 2d 754 (1982).
"'Reinstatement of Coogan, 35 Ohio St. 2d 114, 298 N.E. 2d 518 (1973).
'Reinstatement of Rasor, 40 Ohio St. 2d 25, 317 N.E. 2d 915 (1974).
m'Reinstatement of Fleck, 29 Ohio St. 2d 82, 278 N.E. 2d 669 (1972).
"'Reinstatement of Miller, 35 Ohio St. 2d 135, 298 N.E. 2d 583 (1973).
tmReinstatement of Kearns, 28 Ohio St. 2d 121, 276 N.E. 2d 650 (1971).
"'In re Andreani, 14 Cal. 2d 736, 749, 97 P. 2d 456, 462 (1939).
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was most demanding and not automatic." ' During the next seventeen years,
Ohio continued to pursue vigorously and with fewer abortive attempts the
more serious offenses, particularly in the post-Watergate era. Lawyer popula-
tion doubled between 1974 and 1983, but disciplinary enforcement more than
kept pace.
Available sanctions have been augmented to provide a fairer response to
less serious misconduct, as the awkward gap between indefinite suspension and
public reprimand was closed by the adoption of one year suspensions.
Reinstatement was not automatic, but was less demanding and more com-
passionate than during the first ten years.
Spokesmen for the American Bar Association view the Clark reform as
uncompleted in Ohio, absent a state-wide, unified disciplinary system. Ohio is,
in fact, centralized in terms of disciplinary rule-making power and adjudica-
tion, which rest exclusively in the Ohio Supreme Court. Criticism is addressed
to the existence of ninety-four potential relators at the point of intake with in-
vestigative and prosecutorial powers. 3' The criticism is muted somewhat by
the fact that most cases were brought by only seven relators - six large,
metropolitan bar associations, and the Ohio State Bar Association with a full
time staff of disciplinary counsel, whose contribution was especially useful for
complaints from the smaller counties. But whether the number is potentially
ninety-four, or effectively seven, the system is not unified. The matter is simply
one of degree.
A development that is likely to shape the future course of discipline in
Ohio and lead to the eventual centralization of the relatorship function was the
creation in 1977 of the Office of Disciplinary Counsel as an arm of the Ohio
Supreme Court and the Board. Initially, it was a two-lawyer office with ex-
clusive jurisdiction over advertising and publicity offenses, and backup
jurisdiction when called upon by a local relator. 3 In 1983, its jurisdiction was
expanded to include exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of misconduct involv-
ing judges and candidates for judicial office, power to investigate and pros-
ecute any complaint that comes to its attention, and to supersede a local bar
association for delay in an investigation. 33 The loser has been the Ohio State
2 Schroeder, supra note 10, at 33.
2 Clark viewed too much decentralization as a prime cause for the scandalous situation that he found.
Decentralization in the hands of lower courts produced a lack of uniformity in sanctions imposed. Pros-
ecutorial power in the hands of local bar associations, especially smaller ones, meant that lawyers were re-
quired to discipline one another with the evils of cronyism and the "good old boy" syndrome. Clark, supra
note 2, at 801.
...Gov. R. V, Amendments effective April 21, 1977, 52 Ohio St. 2d 29, xxiii (1977).
2 Gov. R. V, Sec. (3): ". . . All complaints alleging violations of DR 2- 101 and DR 2-102(A) and (B) shall be
referred to or filed with Disciplinary Counsel." Id., Sec. 14):
Disciplinary Counsel and any committee authorized by any regularly organized bar association shall
investigate any matter referred to them or which comes to their attention and may cause complaint to
be filed pursuant to this rule ...
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Bar Association, who has been decertified as a relator, and the potential losers
are the local bar associations.
The local bar associations are apprehensive of the newcomer. The con-
cern stems from the potential for abuse, or imprudent use, of concentrated
power. For one thing, all complaints that result in formal charges have been
screened by the local or state bar association by a Grievance Committee who
looks for probable cause, much like a grand jury. No such committee screens
the charges brought by Disciplinary Counsel. He operates by information, not
by true bill. For another, there is a fear that the Disciplinary Counsel will be
"too tough" with regard to less serious misconduct that may be viewed at the
local level as not an offense, or not a substantial offense, or one that may be
remedied by a less drastic alternative (e.g., malpractice suit). The fear is not
without foundation.234
Apart from the issue of decentralization, the court has failed to avail itself
of a full panoply of sanctions recommended by ABA Standards: definite period
suspension of six months to three years;235 court ordered restitution; 236 and pro-
bation.237 Court ordered restitution is important, since numerous complaints
stem from money owed clients through a breach of trust by the attorney. It
provides little relief to the client that the attorney is suspended, but the debt
unpaid, or even unrecognized in the form of an enforceable decree.
The investigation of complaints shall be concluded within sixty days from the date of the receipt of
the complaint. A decision as to the disposition of such complaint shall be made within thirty days
thereafter. Extensions of time for completion of the investigation may he granted upon written re-
quest, and for good cause shown, by the Secretary or Acting Secretary. of the Board of Commis-
sioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Bar. If the investigation is not completed within sixty
days from the date of filing the complaint and no written request has been made for an extension of
time, the matter under investigation shall be referred to the Disciplinary Counsel. No extension of
time shall be granted beyond one-hundred-fifty days from the date of receipt of the complaint. If an
investigation by the (irievance Committee of a local bar association is not completed within one-
hundred-fifty days from the date of filing the complaint, the matter under investigation shall be re-
ferred to the Disciplinary Counsel.
Rules for the Government of the Judiciary I:
All complaints and grievances alleging misconduct of a judge or candidate for judicial office, or alleg-
ing that a judge is unable to discharge the duties of judicial office by virtue of a mental or a physical
disability shall be filed with the Disciplinary Counsel. Disciplinary Counsel shall have exclusive
authority to investigate such complaints, file formal complaints with the Board, and prosecute formal
complaints filed with the Board.
"'A concern was expressed by Board of Commissioners and Grievance and Discipline Chairman Robert M.
Blakemore of the Akron Bar, Lawyer ,ys Discipline Is Too Tough. The Plain Dealer. Sec. D- 1, col. 1. Oct.
4, 1984:
Blakemore said he thought Gagliardo IDisciplinary Counsell was too tough on lawyers accused of
first offenses such as missing a court deadline or allowing the statute of limitation to expire on a case.
Blakemore said he does not believe every case of negligence should be prosecuted.
Gagliardo looks at every such negligence case as a serious ethics violation.
"We need to consider circumstances (particularlyl how the client was affected, if restitution has
been made and the lawyer's general conduct."
"'ABA Standard 6.3: "Suspension should be ordered for a specified period not in excess of three years."
-'Id. Sec. 6.12: "The Court may require a respondent to make restitution to persons financially injured by
his willful conduct and to reimburse the client security fund."
"'Id. Sec. 6.7: "Probation should be imposed for a specified period, not in excess of two years."
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Probation has been recognized only once in Ohio, and denied thrice for
want of the machinery of supervision, counseling and review. Probation
should be added to the sanctions while simultaneously organizing the human
resources of Ohio's state and metropolitan bar associations to serve as proba-
tion authorities.
Ohio has failed to include in its rules a physical disability inactive status,
whereby those identified as too ill to practice competently, whether by reason
of alcoholism or other disease, may be involuntarily removed without stigma,
and may be reinstated when rehabilitated in a medical, and not a moral, sense.
This procedure is more humane and less socially costly than permitting the
consequences of the illness to run into fourteen counts of misconduct to estab-
lish a conclusive case of misconduct, to the hurt of the clients and the lawyer.23
Ohio suffers from the same problems endemic to disciplinary enforcement
predicated upon the ABA Standards and the present Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility: failure on the part of lawyers and judges, generally, to report ob-
served misconduct,23 9 unless the lawyer or judge is the victim of the offense;
that the system is generally dependent upon triggering by a written, signed
complaint, absent the notoriety of the misconduct, i.e., it is not self-starting;2
the unevenness of sanctions absent appropriate sentencing guidelines;"' that
the system is fault-oriented, predicated historically on notions of "moral turpi-
tude," and is deficient as a system of quality control, predicated upon efficien-
cy and economy of performance.242 A Clark Report of these days would focus
on professional incompetence, its causes and its cures, less on immoral con-
duct.
Ohio began its reforms earlier and from a point of departure different
from the Clark Report which was yet to come. Its hybrid system conceived by
Bar President Boer was designed to improve the system while preserving the
"Stark County Bar Association v. Lukens, 48 Ohio St. 2d 187, 357 N.E. 2d 1083 (1976).
...See Sternberg, Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility: 1982-83 Annual Report, 56 Wisc. BAR
BULL. 17 (Dec., 1983). In analyzing 1098 Board files closed, the source of grievance from lawyers were 95 or
8.7% and from judges 14 or 1.3%, for a total of 10% from these two categories. Fifty-four, 4.8%, were
Board or staff initiated, and the remainder of 935, or 85.2%, were from clients or the adverse party. These
data are not atypical.
2
"ld.
-"McP ke and Harrison, The True Stor oJ Law 'er Discipline. 70 A.B.A.J. 92, at 94 11984) reports that the
A.B.A. is formulating standards for appropriate lawyer discipline.
The court has operated uniformly but harshly with solicitation offenses, whether a statewide scheme in-
volving lay persons as runners, as in the workers' compensation field, or a single transaction. Cf. Columbus
Bar Association v. Jurus. 175 Ohio St. 449, 196 N.E. 2d 94 11964) and Columbus Bar Association v. Agee,
175 Ohio St. 2d 98. 196 N.E. 2d 98 119641 - both involving worker's compensation - with the single
episode in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (19781. who signed up two victims of an acci-
dent. one in her hospital room. Each of the three lawyers was indefinitely suspended.
"'Marks and Cathcart, Discipline within the Legal Profession: Is It Self Regulation?. 1974 ILL. L. FORUM
193, concluded that the Code of Professional Responsibility has failed as a device for promoting efficient
legal services. Performance issues will likely have to be dealt with separately, apart from the Code.
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roles of its powerful state and metropolitan bar associations. Although hybrid,
the system has worked, though it may be improved.
The future is likely to see the reform as contemplated by the Clark Report
fully effected, through further centralization of discipline in the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of the Ohio Supreme Court. Ohio's state and local bar
associations will then play a different, but important, role. No longer relators
pursuing the errant, they may serve as rescuers of the afflicted. No longer ac-
cusers of miscreants, they may serve as assessors of quality. For, professional
responsibility comprises not only good conduct, but efficient performance.24 In
the latter lies the challenge of the future.
TABLE I
Ohio Disciplinary Actions 196 7-1983, Inclusive
Source: Official Ohio State Reports and Disciplinary
Actions as Reported in OBAR
Disciplinary Action







































































































































*One year suspensions not available until 1981 and thereafter
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TA.BLE II






Prior Criminal Convictions 35
Income Tax Violations 22
Willful Failure to File Return 20
Filing False Return 2
Other Criminal Misconduct
Fraud (Conspiracy to Embezzle, 3
Filing False Insurance Claim,
Issuing Checks to Defraud)
Obstructing Justice (Conspiracy to Bribe, 3
Tampering with Public Records (2))
Property Offenses (Grand Theft, 3
Receiving Stolen Property, Petit Theft)
Assault (Felonious, Aggravating Menace) 2
Conspiracy to Deal in Firearms I
Trafficking in Drugs I
Neglect and/or Failure to Seek Lawful Objectives
of Client 23
Mishandling Clients' Money, and/or
Commingling and/or Failure to Account 18
Breach of Confidential Relationship and/or
Using Client's Secret to Advantage of Another
and/or Representing Adverse Interests 4
Implying Use of Improper Influence 2
Solicitation 2
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:3
40
Akron Law Review, Vol. 18 [1985], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol18/iss3/2
Winter, 19851 LAWYER DISCIPLINE IN OHIO 403
Miscellaneous 6
Attempt to Influence Witness
Check Kiting
Failure to Inform Court of State of Case
(Fraud on Tribunal)
Failure to Terminate Relationship
Where Client Has No Valid Claim
Malicious Verbal Attack on Judge,
Outside Courtroom




Samad: Lawyer Discipline in Ohio
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1985
42
Akron Law Review, Vol. 18 [1985], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol18/iss3/2
